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There is a strong, positive and well-documented correlation between education and health outcomes.
There is much less evidence on the extent to which this correlation reflects the causal effect of education
on health - the parameter of interest for policy. In this paper we attempt to overcome the difficulties
associated with estimating the causal effect of education on health. Our approach exploits two changes
to British compulsory schooling laws that generated sharp differences in educational attainment among
individuals born just months apart. Using regression discontinuity methods, we confirm that the cohorts
just affected by these changes completed significantly more education than slightly older cohorts subject
to the old laws. However, we find little evidence that this additional education improved health outcomes
or changed health behaviors. We argue that it is hard to attribute these findings to the content of the
additional education or the wider circumstances that the affected cohorts faced (e.g., universal health
insurance). As such, our results suggest caution as to the likely health returns to educational interventions
focused on increasing educational attainment among those at risk of dropping out of high school, a
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There is a well-established yet striking correlation between health and education.1 Across sexes,
races and time, more-educated people enjoy better health than less-educated people.2 Even at
lower levels of education, these correlations are strong. For example, in the US, the fraction of
adults with 11 years of education reporting fair or poor health in 2006 was 25.6 percent. Among
those with exactly a high school degree, the analogous gure was 14.4 percent.3 As shown by
Banks et al. (2006) and Cutler & Lleras-Muney (2007), similar patterns can be found in the UK.
Not surprisingly, these statistics inspire strong views about the relationship between education and
health. Typical of these is Michael Grossman's claim that "years of formal schooling completed is
the most important correlate of good health" (Grossman, 2005, pg. 32).
From an education perspective, the strength of this relationship suggests that health could be
one of the most important sources of non-monetary returns to education.4 As such, traditional
cost-benet analyses that ignore health could understate the attractiveness of educational invest-
ments. From a health perspective, the relationship suggests that education could be a powerful
tool for improving health, especially given the ambiguity in the returns to additional health care
spending (Weinstein & Skinner, 2010). Health policy-makers have taken note of this correlation.
For example, the U.S. national health objectives include targets for high school completion rates
(Healthy People 2010) and the British government has cited potential health benets as a reason
why the compulsory schooling age might be raised to 18 (Seager, 2009). These policies will, how-
ever, only be eective if education causes individuals to be healthier. Yet the causal nature of the
education-health relationship is not well-established, particularly in view of the strong associations
between education and other characteristics such as ability (Griliches, 1977) and discount rates
(Fuchs, 1982). As such, the causal eect of education on health may be smaller than the partial
correlation between education and health.
Quasi-experiments represent a promising approach to identifying the causal eects of education
1See Adams et al. (2003) and references cited therein for a good summary of this literature.
2The correlational studies look at many dierent dimensions of the health-education gradient - over time (Pappas
et al., 1993), over the life cycle (Beckett, 2000; Lynch, 2003), across sexes (Christenson & Johnson, 1995; McDonough
et al., 1999), and across races (Williams & Collins, 1995). The rst seminal study of this relationship was that of
Kitagawa & Hauser (1968).
3We base these calculations on data from the 2006 National Health Interview Survey.
4See Oreopoulos & Salvanes (2009) for further discussion of this point.
1on health. A strand of the recent education-health literature employs this approach. As sum-
marized by Cutler & Lleras-Muney (2006) and Grossman (2004), the consensus from this quasi-
experimental literature is that education improves health.5 Among these studies, Lleras-Muney
(2005) is prominent. She uses instrumental variables methods to exploit state-level changes in
compulsory schooling policies and child labor laws across the United States during the rst half
of the 20th century. Her results suggest that the mortality eects of education are large. She
estimates that an extra year of schooling reduces 10-year mortality rates (i.e., the probability of
dying between successive decennial censuses) by over 30 percent.6 Yet these policy changes aected
cohorts for whom educational attainment was already rising and mortality was already falling. This
implies that the validity of these estimates depends on the correct specication of these concur-
rent trends. Mazumder (2007) shows that estimated education impacts are highly sensitive to the
specication of these trends. A regression discontinuity design could, potentially, mitigate these
concerns by exploiting sharp changes in educational attainment. Lleras-Muney (2005) supplements
her main analysis with such an approach but acknowledges that the samples are too small to draw
rm conclusions. Albouy & Lequien (2009) use regression discontinuity methods to examine the
mortality eects of two compulsory schooling changes in France, but their analysis is hampered by
small sample sizes and the imprecision of the "rst stage" estimates falling into the realm of weak
instruments.
This paper presents new evidence on the education-health relationship using a 1947 change and
a 1972 change to British compulsory school laws. The 1947 change meant that children born before
April 1, 1933 (who turned 14 before 1 April 1947) could leave school when they turned 14, whereas
children born after this date could not leave until they turned 15. The 1972 change extended the
compulsory schooling age further: children born after September 1, 1957 could not leave until they
turned 16.
There are two main reasons why the changes to British compulsory schooling laws can provide
valuable new evidence on the relationship between education and health. First, as stressed by
Oreopoulos (2006), since many students in Britain leave school at the earliest opportunity, these
5These papers include Adams (2002); Arendt (2005); Arkes (2003); Berger & Leigh (1989); Deschenes (2009);
de Walque (2007); Grimard & Parent (2007); Kenkel et al. (2006); Lleras-Muney (2005).
6Lleras-Muney (2005) calculates mortality rates using population counts from the 1960-1980 Censuses of cohorts
born between 1901 and 1925. Her main specications imply that an extra year of education reduces 10-year mortality
rates between 3 and 4 percentage points o of a mean base mortality rate of 10 percent.
2changes aected a large portion of the population, particularly in comparison to U.S. compulsory
school law changes. The rst change in Britain kept around one half of the aected cohorts in school
for an extra year; the second change kept around one quarter of the aected cohorts in school for
an extra year. In comparison, the U.S. policy changes aected roughly 5 percent of the relevant
cohort (Lleras-Muney, 2002; Goldin & Katz, 2009). Estimates based on these British law changes
are, therefore, likely to generate estimates closer to an average treatment eect (Oreopoulos, 2006).
Second, because these law changes induced such sharp changes in educational attainment, regres-
sion discontinuity methods can pinpoint the eects of education on health. These methods rest on
a relatively mild assumption: that individuals' proximate in date of birth would otherwise have had
similar health outcomes. This assumption seems plausible and, furthermore, is testable, at least in
terms of observable characteristics.
Although this is not the rst paper to use regression discontinuity methods to assess the health
impacts of these changes { Oreopoulos (2006) supplemented his study of the earnings impacts of
the 1947 change with an analysis of their impact on self-reported health { we extend the existing
research in several ways. First, we assess the mortality impacts of these compulsory schooling
changes, as well as their impacts on self-reported health, weight and blood pressure, and on health
behaviors such as smoking, drinking and exercise. Second, we assess the impacts of both the 1947
and 1972 changes. Our use of multiple outcomes and both school leaving changes ensures that our
estimates are not particular to one outcome at one point in time. Third, we assess the impacts
of these changes using data at the month-of-birth level; Oreopoulos (2006) uses year-of-birth com-
parisons. Since the compulsory schooling changes were introduced mid-year (April 1st 1947 and
September 1st 1972), this assigns the appropriate treatment to each cohort and ensures that our
estimates are based on the weakest possible identication assumptions { a comparison of cohorts
born a month apart.7 Although estimates of the earnings impacts of these changes appear invariant
to whether the analysis is done at the year- or month-of-birth level, we nd that for some health
outcomes, year-of-birth contrasts could yield quite misleading estimates.
7Since we began work on this project, Jurges et al. (2009) have used month-of-birth contrasts to estimate the
impacts of the 1947 and 1972 compulsory schooling changes on self-related health and two biomarkers (blood
brinogen and C-reactive protein levels). Consistent with our estimates of the impacts of these changes on other
outcomes available from the HSE nurse visits (e.g., blood pressure), they nd no evidence for causal impacts on
these outcomes. They nd some evidence for a causal eect on women's self-rated health, although these estimates
are imprecise. In one part of our analysis, we use census data based on much larger samples to show that the
compulsory schooling changes had very small eects on the self-reported health of both men and women.
3Our analysis conrms that these compulsory school law changes led to sharp increases in com-
pleted years of education. We also conrm that the 1947 change increased the earnings of aected
men (estimates for women are imprecise, as are estimates of the earnings impacts of the 1972
change). Despite these eects on education and earnings, we estimate that the 1947 change had no
signicant impact on mortality between the ages of 45 and 69 and we can rule out reduced-form mor-
tality reductions larger than 0.08 percentage points (o a base of 18.4%). We estimate that the 1972
change had only small eects on mortality between the ages 20 and 44 and we can rule out reduced-
form mortality reductions larger than 0.34 percentage points (o a base of 2.4%). We also estimate
that both changes had, at best, small impacts on a wide range of health outcomes and health behav-
iors. These ndings contrast with the positive eects on self-reported health found by Oreopoulos
(2006). Our results also contrast with Silles (2009), who uses both compulsory schooling changes in
an instrumental variables approach to understand the eects of schooling on self-reported health.
There are no obvious explanations for the small health eects that we nd. It is hard to attribute
them to the presence of universal health insurance in Britain, since there are pronounced socioeco-
nomic dierences in both access to care and quality of care in Britain (the Black Report (of Health &
Security, 1980), the Whitehead Report (Whitehead, 1987), and the Acheson Report (Acheson et al.,
1998)). It is hard to attribute them to the quality of the additional years of education induced by
these changes, since for men at least, the 1947 change has a statistically signicant impact on earn-
ings. It is hard to attribute them to the wider circumstances facing cohorts aected by these compul-
sory schooling changes. The 1947 change followed a period of rapid social change (e.g., the Great De-
pression and Second World War) but the 1972 change did not. One could argue that these changes
did not improve health because they did not aect the teenage peer group of aected cohorts, but
they should have changed their adult peer groups via their impacts on labor market outcomes.
The alternative explanation is that these types of education intervention have a small causal
impact on health, one that our regression discontinuity design is uniquely able to isolate. This sug-
gests that despite other benets (Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2009), these types of education policies
may be an ineective means of achieving health goals. For the US, this implies that the educational
objectives of Healthy People 2010, which include a high school completion goal of 90 percent, may
be less eective than hoped. For England and Wales, this implies that plans to increase further the
compulsory school leaving age in England and Wales may not have the health benets that have
4been claimed for them.
II The Relationship Between Education and Health
In this section we discuss the mechanisms that might generate a causal relationship between
education and health. This sets the scene for our empirical analysis and informs the discussion of
our estimates. These mechanisms can be categorized into the direct and indirect eects of education
on health. Note that we restrict attention to the relationship between education and own health.
There is a large related literature on the impact of education on infant health (e.g., Currie &
Moretti (2003); McCrary & Royer (2006)), but that is not the focus of this paper.
Education might have a direct eect on health and health behaviors via its inuence on produc-
tive and allocative eciency (Grossman, 2005). That is, education may impart direct knowledge
about health and health behaviors, thereby shifting the health production function. In addition,
education could change the allocation of health inputs.
The proposed indirect eects are broad. The most frequently-mentioned is the eect of edu-
cation on labor market opportunities - higher rates of employment and increased earnings (Card,
1999). The labor market returns could inuence health by increasing the aordability of health-
improving goods (e.g., gym membership), by increasing access to medical care (via increased income
or employer-based health insurance) or by reducing income volatility and hence stress. There are
many other indirect mechanisms through which the education-health link could run. For example,
more-educated people could work in safer environments (Cutler & Lleras-Muney, 2006), they could
be more patient and hence more likely to engage in healthier behaviors (Fuchs, 1982; Becker &
Mulligan, 1997), they could have a higher rank in society (Rose & Marmot, 1981) or they could
be exposed to healthier peers (Duncan et al., 2005; Gaviria & Raphael, 2001; Powell et al., 2005;
Trogdon et al., 2008). Note that empirical evidence distinguishing the relative importance of these
mechanisms is limited, due partly to a lack of data and partly to the identication problems asso-
ciated with estimating the causal eect of education on these various mechanisms.8
8Using US data, Cutler & Lleras-Muney (2006) provide a thorough analysis of the cross-sectional relationship
between education, health and these intervening mechanisms. Although they acknowledge that it is hard to draw
rm conclusions, they speculate that eciency eects are especially important, perhaps even more important than
income eects. In support of that conclusion, Lleras-Muney (2005) estimates a strong relationship between education
and mortality even after controlling for income. In an analysis of British data, Cutler & Lleras-Muney (2007) nd that
the British gradient weakens (by between 9 and 35 percent) when cognitive ability is controlled and when measures of
social integration are controlled (by around 10 percent). To the extent that there exists a causal relationship between
education and health in Britain, this suggests that some of it might run through cognitive ability and social integration.
5This discussion has three important implications for quasi-experimental studies of the relationship
between education and health. First, since the health eects of education might operate through
several channels (e.g., eects on tastes versus eects on earnings), a quasi-experimental manipula-
tion of education might aect health even if it does not aect earnings. Second, since the health
eects of these channels may be dierent, dierent sources of education variation (e.g., variation
generated by compulsory schooling laws versus variation generated by college-related policies) could
impact dierent channels and thus, have dierent health eects. Third, since the health eects of
these channels could be both positive or negative, a zero eect of education on health could reect
positive eects operating through some channels and negative eects operating through others. A
channel through which education might have negative eects on health is income. That is because
education is known to increase income and because, as found by Snyder & Evans (2006), income
might have a negative eect on mortality.
With these implications in mind, we view the quasi-experimental variation exploited in our study
as particularly informative. First, since we identify the eects of two compulsory schooling changes,
and since these changes aected a large share of the population, our estimates might be a useful
guide to the eects of future policy interventions of this type. Second, because we can examine
the eects of this variation through several channels (e.g., health behaviors), we can, for example,
assess whether the net impacts of education reect positive eects operating through some channels
and negative eects operating through others. This contrasts with the prior literature, which tends
to focus on a limited set of outcomes.
III Compulsory Schooling in Britain
The laws governing the length of compulsory education in Britain are national. This is an impor-
tant contrast to U.S. compulsory school laws, which are state-regulated. The British compulsory
schooling laws specify the maximum age by which children must start school and the minimum
age at which children can leave school. The maximum age by which children must start school
is currently ve.9 We focus on variation in the minimum age at which children can leave school.
We study a 1947 change that increased the compulsory school leaving age from fourteen to fteen
9As discussed by Woodhead (1989), there has been a recent trend for students to start school before ve, with
practice varying across local authorities. Crawford et al. (2007) provide a thorough analysis of the impacts of British
school start policies.
6and a 1972 change that increased it from fteen to sixteen. The rst of these changes meant that
students could not leave school until part way through grade nine. The second meant they could
not leave school until part way through grade ten.
Both the 1947 and 1972 changes were the products of long political campaigns. Under the slogan
of \Secondary Education for All" and on the grounds that fourteen year olds were too young to
work, various groups campaigned for the change from 14 to 15 throughout the 1920s and 1930s.
Most commentators agree that the law would have been changed in the 1930s had war not broken
out (Timmins, 1996). As the war drew to a close, the 1944 Education Act was passed. This Act
raised the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15 and a Ministerial order later in 1944 specied
that it would be raised on 1 April 1947. This gave school districts over two years to prepare for the
change. The 1944 Act also gave the Minister of Education the power to raise the age to 16, when
conditions allowed. The Minister did this in March 1972 (Statutory Instrument No. 444) and the
age was raised to 16 on 1 September 1972. Some opposed the 1947 change on the grounds that
it would compromise the war recovery eort by diverting resources to schools and decreasing the
supply of juvenile labor. Supporters countered that this would be oset by the higher quality of
labor supplied.10 The 1972 change was less controversial.
Figure 1 illustrates the impacts of these changes in the context of the wider trends in educational
attainment in Britain.11 This gure shows the fraction of men with completed years of education
in each of four categories: nine years or less, ten years or less, eleven years or less and no university
degree.12 This gure presents data at the quarter-of-birth level using Health Survey of England
data, described in more detail below. The 1947 change reduced the fraction that completed nine
years or less by roughly one half; the 1972 change decreased the fraction that completed ten years
by roughly one quarter. As shown below, ner month-of-birth comparisons and regression-based
analyses point to similar conclusions.
In some respects, the two changes were similar. Both were secured by an extensive program of
school building and the key elements of the school system did not change between 1947 and 1972.
10O'Keefe (1975) summarizes the debate surrounding the reform.
11Deaton & Paxson (1999) use this cross-cohort variation in schooling to understand the relationship between
schooling and mortality in Britain. They estimate that an additional year of schooling reduces the odds of mortality
by 2 percent.
12The parallel gure for women looks similar. We analyze the health eects of these changes on both men and
women.
7In particular, students attended primary school until fth grade, after which they were tracked (via
a primary school test) into dierent types of secondary school: "grammar schools" for the most
able (roughly 20%); "modern schools" for the remainder.13,14 The law changes most likely aected
students in the modern schools.
In other respects, the character of the two changes was dierent. First, while the 1972 change
increased the fraction of cohorts that received formal qualications, it is less clear what the extra
year of education generated by the 1947 change entailed.15 Ministry of Education reports and
commentary from the time suggest that schools used the extra year to introduce some students to
more advanced material and help other students master more basic material.16 Whatever the extra
year entailed, estimates of the labor market returns to this extra year suggest it was highly valued
by the labor market: Harmon & Walker (1995); Oreopoulos (2006); Devereux & Hart (2008) all
nd statistically signicant returns for men; only Devereux & Hart (2008) fail to nd statistically
signicant returns for women. Our own analysis conrms that the 1947 compulsory schooling
change had a statistically signicant impact on the earnings of aected men (see Appendix C for
analysis; estimates for women are less precise). The 1972 compulsory schooling change was less
powerful, hence the results are less clear.
Second, the circumstances facing the cohorts aected by these two changes were very dierent.
The cohorts aected by the 1947 change were born during the Great Depression and had their
education disrupted by war.17 Although the men aected by the change were too young to ght
13We dene these grades using U.S. labels. In Britain, grades nine and ten are referred to as "year ten" and "year
eleven." This is because the U.S. kindergarten year is "year one" in Britain.
14These proportions varied by local schools authority. In 1947, some authorities had yet to make secondary schools
(either modern or grammar) available to all students. Instead, students attended all-age schools that were expanded
to accommodate the students aected by the 1947 compulsory schooling change. By 1972, some local authorities
had replaced this system with one in which all children attended the same "comprehensive" secondary school.
15By the 1970s, high schools in England oered a series of two-year courses that ran through grades nine and ten
and required students to sit formal examinations at the end of grade ten ("O" levels and Certicate of Secondary
Education). Hence, by compelling students to stay in school until part way through grade ten, the 1972 change gave
students an incentive to complete these courses.
16According to a 1947 Ministry of Education report, "the main value...of the lengthened school course lies in
the fact that the schools will now be able to do more eectively in four years what they previously had to do in
three. Even more important, it gives the schools a better chance of exercising a permanent inuence for good on
those who pass through them" (HSMO, 1948) p.13. Based on various school district reports of the implementation
of the new law, a leader commented in the Times Educational Supplement on 5 April 1947 that \Teacher supply,
accommodation and curricula are not reckoned by those directly responsible to be the insuperable problems they
seem to some despondent outside observers." (p.156)
17Evacuation of school-aged children (aged 5 to 15) went into eect in September 1939. School children from \evac-
uation" areas thought at risk were sent to \reception " areas; \neutral" areas were not aected. Around 40% of school
children in London were evacuated; gures for other evacuation areas are smaller. Some of these children were away
for up to two years, although many returned sooner and all attended school in the reception areas (Titmuss, 1950).
8in the Second World War, they were required to serve two years of military service from ages 18
to 20.18 Both men and women were aected by rationing, introduced in 1940 and removed in 1954
(Zweiniger-Bargielowska, 2000). This ensured that modest quantities of certain foodstus (mainly
sugar, dairy products and meat) were shared equally among the population.19 These circumstances
likely do not threaten the internal validity of our 1947 estimates as exposure to these events was
similar for cohorts born on either side of the 1 April 1933 cuto. These circumstances might
however aect external validity. For this reason, the contrast with the 1972 change, which occurred
during less eventful times, is especially useful.
IV Empirical Strategy
The sharp changes in educational attainment generated by these changes to compulsory schooling
laws provide us with an excellent opportunity to analyze the health eects of education. Our
analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we estimate the education eects of these compulsory law
changes. Second, we estimate the mortality eects of these changes. Third, we estimate the health
eects of these changes and use the changes to estimate the health eects of additional years of
completed education. In the remainder of this section, we discuss these steps in more detail.
A The Impacts of the Compulsory Schooling Changes on Education
We use a standard regression discontinuity framework (Lee & Lemieux, 2009; Imbens & Lemieux,
2008) to estimate the eects of the compulsory law changes on educational attainment, our "rst
stage" relationship. Specically, we estimate the following equation separately for each law change:
Eict = 0 + 1Dic + f(Ric) + X0
ict2 + uict (1)
where the dependent variable is a measure of educational attainment for individual i in birth
cohort c at time t, D is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual belongs to a post-
change cohort, R is an individual's birth cohort (measured in months) relative to the relevant
cuto (April 1933 for the 1947 change, September 1957 for the 1972 change) and X includes pre-
determined characteristics such as the year of the survey. The function f(:) captures the underlying
18See Scott (1993) for details of post-war conscription policies and Buonnono (2006) for an analysis of the labor
market impacts of military service based on its phasing out in 1960.
19Many have argued that rationing may have improved the nutritional content of the typical diet (Prynne et al.,
2007).
9relationship between birth cohort and educational attainment. The inclusion of the vector X can,
potentially, reduce the residual variation in the outcome, thereby improving the precision of the
estimates. Its inclusion should not, however, aect our estimates of 1, since for individuals born
near the cuto (i.e., April 1933 or September 1957), the elements of X should be uncorrelated
with being born on one side of the cuto or the other. The term u is the error term representing
unobservable factors aecting educational attainment. The parameter of ultimate interest is 1,
the eect of the law changes on completed education.
There are two ways to estimate the parameter 1. First, one can choose a parametric function
for f (e.g., a quadratic polynomial in R) and use all of the available data to estimate the equation
above via ordinary least squares (Lee & Card, 2008), typically referred to as the global polynomial
approach. Second, one can specify f(:) to be a linear function of R (fully interacted with D -
such that the cohort trends can have dierent slopes on either side of the threshold) and estimate
the equation over a narrower range of data, typically referred to as the local linear approach. As
discussed by Lee & Lemieux (2009); Imbens & Lemieux (2008), this approach can be viewed as
generating estimates that are more local to the threshold. It will be especially useful if a parametric
function estimated over all of the data cannot adequately capture the relationship between birth
cohort and completed education. We adopt the local linear approach and choose the bandwidth
using the cross-validation procedure suggested by Imbens & Lemieux (2008). We also test the
sensitivity of estimates to the chosen bandwidths.20 In unreported results, we nd that the global
polynomial approach produces similar estimates.
B The Impacts of the Compulsory Schooling Changes on Mortality
We use two methods to exploit the regression discontinuity approach and analyze the mortality
eects of these changes. First, we use the panel nature of the data (i.e., we observe birth cohorts
over time) to perform a hazard analysis (Efron, 1988). This is the approach adopted by Sullivan &
von Wachter (2007) and Lee & McCrary (2009). Second, we use a "cross-sectional" approach like
that used to estimate the education eects of these changes, where the dependent variable is the
fraction of a cohort that died within a certain age interval. For comparability with the previous
literature, we also report estimates from cross-sectional models in which the dependent variable is
20For space considerations, we do not report estimates using alternative bandwidths.
10a ten-year mortality rate.
The hazard approach makes ecient use of the panel nature of the data. Under this approach,
we estimate the following panel logit model of the probability of dying at time t conditional on
being alive at time t-1:21
P(Yict = 1jDic;Xict) = F(1Dic + X0
ict2) (2)
where Y equals 1 if individual i in cohort c is dead in period t and 0 otherwise, F is the logit
cumulative distribution function, and the vector X includes age in months and a polynomial in
the running variable R.22 Each person i contributes n observations to this regression where n is
the number of time periods from 1970 to 2007 during which person i is alive. We use likelihood
ratio tests to determine the appropriate degree of the polynomial in R. These tests compare the
likelihood function for the least restrictive model (i.e., the model that includes xed eects for each
value of R) with that for the imposed polynomial model. Instead of reporting estimates of 1,
we report log odds ratios, eectively comparing the mortality risk of a person in the just-aected
cohort with that of a person in the just-unaected cohort.
The cross-sectional approach involves estimation of reduced-form equations of the following form:
Fx;y
c = 0 + 1Dc + g(Rc) + X0
c2 + vct (3)
where F is the fraction of birth cohort c that dies between ages x and y, where the denominator of
this fraction is the size of the cohort at birth. Again, the function g(:) is a fully-interacted linear
polynomial in R designed to control for cohort-level trends. The other variables in equation (3)
are dened as before and v is an error term. For data reasons discussed below, R is measured in
quarters for the 1947 change and in months for the 1972 change. We measure mortality at the
cohort level rather than at the individual level because the mortality data include no individual-
level covariates aside from sex. Since the covariates should be uncorrelated with D, their inclusion
might improve the precision of our estimates but would have little eect on their magnitude. We
21t denotes month for both the 1947 and 1972 reforms.
22Eectively one can estimate, as we do, this regression using cohort-level grouped data, but we present it as an
individual-level regression equation for exposition reasons.
11examine the eects for dierent ages (i.e., for dierent values of x and y) as the eects of education
on health could vary across the age distribution.
C The Impacts of Education on Other Health Outcomes
We use a standard "fuzzy" regression discontinuity framework to estimate the impacts of the ad-
ditional education induced by the compulsory law changes on other measures of health and health
behaviors. In particular, we treat equation (1) as a rst-stage equation and add an outcome equa-
tion describing the relationship between these outcomes and education:
Hict = 0 + 1Eic + h(Ric) + X0
ict2 + wict (4)
where H is a health outcome (e.g., self-reported health) for individual i belonging to cohort c at
time t. In this equation, the relationship between the dependent variable and birth cohort is cap-
tured by the function h(:), which we again specify to be a fully-interacted linear function of R.
The parameter 1 is the eect of an additional year of education. The error term w will include
omitted determinants of these outcomes (e.g., family background). Since these are likely correlated
with education, least squares estimation of this equation would generate inconsistent estimates of
1. This motivates our regression discontinuity approach.
We combine equations (1) and (4) and estimate 1 via two-stage least squares, using Dic as
the excluded instrument. As recommended by Imbens & Lemieux (2008), we use the bandwidths
suggested by a cross-validation procedure applied to the reduced-form relationship between the
health outcomes and the law changes. Since our rst-stage estimates are robust to the choice of
bandwidth, this procedure generates estimates similar to those obtained by taking the ratio of
the reduced-form to the rst-stage estimates, where the separate estimates are based on separate
bandwidths and where standard errors are calculated using the delta method.
We interpret this estimate as a local average treatment eect, the eect of the additional ed-
ucation for those who would not have received this education in the absence of the law changes
(Imbens & Angrist, 1994). Since these law changes appear to keep students in education for only
one additional year, we interpret these estimates as the eects of an extra year of education for
students compelled to stay an extra year. These eects may be very dierent from the eects of an
additional year of education at other parts of the education distribution. They may also be very
12dierent from the eects of an additional year of education for students that would have remained
in school regardless of the law changes. As argued by Oreopoulos (2006), however, since these
changes aected large fractions of the relevant birth cohorts, these estimates may be close to the
average causal eect of this extra year.
D Identication
The key assumption underlying these procedures is that the conditional expectations of the poten-
tial outcomes (completed education, mortality, self-reported health) with respect to birth cohort
are smooth through the R = 0 threshold. In this case, we can attribute any discontinuities at these
thresholds to the causal eects of the school-leaving changes. Although we cannot test this assump-
tion directly, an implication is that there should be no discontinuities in pre-determined outcomes.
In this context, birth outcomes are the most relevant pre-determined outcomes for which we have
data. We tested for discontinuities in cohort size, sex ratios, infant health (as measured by fraction
stillborn) and illegitimacy rates. Our estimates, not reported to conserve space, suggest no such
discontinuities. This is, perhaps, unsurprising, since these laws were changed after the aected
children were born, limiting the scope for behavior that would generate discontinuities in these
types of pre-determined outcomes.
V Data
A Mortality analyses
To estimate the mortality eects of the compulsory schooling law changes, we use mortality data
obtained from the Oce for National Statistics. These data include counts of deaths among all
residents of England and Wales by month of birth, month of death, and sex for the years 1970 to
2007. As a separate dataset, we also have counts of deaths by general cause (circulatory, pulmonary,
and non-circulatory, non-pulmonary) for the years 1970 to 2004 by quarter of birth, year of death,
and sex.
For the hazard analyses, we estimate all regressions at the month-of-birth level. Such analysis
requires a count of the population at risk of dying in each time period. For the 1947 reform, our
hazard analysis begins in 1970. We infer the population size by birth cohort in 1970 by taking the
population by birth cohort in the 1991 Census (the earliest available) and subtracting the deaths
occurring between 1970 and 1991 by birth cohort; we infer the size of the population at later periods
13by subtracting the deaths occurring between 1970 and these later periods. For the 1972 reform, our
hazard analysis begins in 1972, such that the youngest cohort in the hazard analysis is observed
from age 16 onwards.23 We infer population size in 1972 in a parallel fashion.
For the cross-sectional analyses, the dependent variable is the fraction of a birth cohort that
died between certain ages. The numerators in these fractions come from the mortality data. Birth
counts from the Oce of National Statistics are the denominators. For the cohorts aected by
the 1947 change, we have birth counts by quarter of birth and, we estimate equation (3) at the
quarter-of-birth level. For the cohorts aected by the 1972 change, we have birth counts by month
of birth and we estimate equation (3) at the month-of-birth level.
The biggest limitation of these mortality data is that they start in 1970. Our analysis of the 1947
change will, therefore, miss mortality between 1947 and 1970 - roughly when these cohorts were
aged 15 to 40. While this is not ideal, there are three reasons why we believe that this limitation
does not lessen the value of our analysis. First, this problem does not aect our analysis of the 1972
change. That is, for the cohorts aected by the 1972 compulsory school change, we can observe
mortality from 1972 onwards. Second, this problem is common to other analyses of the mortality
eects of education (e.g., Albouy & Lequien (2009); Deschenes (2009); Lleras-Muney (2005)). This
is because most quasi-experimental studies focus on interventions that occurred many years ago
(to analyze mortality at later ages) and because mortality data are usually available only for more
recent years. Third, we can test for selective mortality before 1970. We do this in three ways.
First, we estimate eects on survival until 1970. Second, we estimate eects on survival until age
45, the youngest age at which we use the cross-sectional analysis to consider the mortality eects
of the 1947 reform. Third, we estimate eects on survival until 1991. While this will identify a
combination of pre- and post-1970 mortality eects, survival to 1991 is easily measured using birth
counts and 1991 Census data. To measure survival to 1970 we use birth counts, 1991 Census data
and deaths recorded between 1970 and 1991.
None of these approaches provide strong grounds for supposing there was dierential mortality
prior to 1970. For example, for men, even after controlling for trends in age, the eect of the
reform on the probability of survival to 1970 is small (0.013 o of a base survival probability of
0.82) and statistically insignicant (standard error 0.001). The estimated eect on the probability
23Our results are similar if the hazard analysis starts in 1970.
14of survival to age 45 is similar, as are the corresponding estimates for women.24 Estimates of the
eects of the reform on survival until 1991 are consistent with small or no eects on either pre- or
post-1970 mortality. Again, for men, after controlling for trends in age, the eect of the reform on
the probability of survival to 1991 is small and statistically insignicant (a 0.01 eect o of a base
probability of 0.78, standard error 0.0098). Again, the estimate is similar for women.25
A second limitation of the mortality data is that they include deaths of people that died in Eng-
land and Wales, not people that were born in England and Wales. The data will then exclude people
born in England and Wales who died elsewhere and will include people born elsewhere who died in
England and Wales. The rst source of migration bias will likely bias us toward nding a protective
health eect of education. In other words, by ignoring migration we might overstate the causal
eects of education on health. This is because existing research suggests that more-educated indi-
viduals are more mobile (Malamud & Wozniak, 2006). In Appendix D we examine and discuss the
eects of the reform on migration patterns to the United States. As expected, our estimates suggest
that post-reform cohorts were, if anything, more likely to migrate to the United States. The second
source of migration bias, the inclusion of immigrants in our mortality counts, is likely less trouble-
some. While immigration to Britain may have responded to the compulsory schooling changes (e.g.,
because of the temporary decline in labor supply), we would expect immigrants to be composed of
roughly equal numbers of people born on either side of the relevant birth cohort thresholds. Con-
sistent with this hypothesis, we nd no discontinuities in the probability of observing immigrants
born in particular months.26 These two limitations are inherent in any mortality analyses.
A third limitation of these mortality counts is that they do not contain any education informa-
tion. Hence, while we can use them to estimate the eects of these law changes on education, we
cannot use them to estimate the eects of education on mortality. Since we nd very small mor-
tality eects of these laws, this is not a major concern, particularly in view of the large rst-stage
eects that we estimate.27
24For men, the eect on the probability of survival until age 45 is 0.013 (base probability 0.80, standard error
0.010). For women, the eect on the probability of survival until 1970 is 0.012 (base probability 0.84, standard error
0.011) and the eect on the probability of survival to age 45 is 0.011 (base probability 0.83, standard error 0.010).
25The estimate is 0.01, o of a base probability of 0.73 (standard error 0.0096).
26These estimates (not reported) are based on pooled Health Survey of England data.
27Note that even if the mortality data had education information, mortality eects of education could bias
estimates of the eects of education on mortality. In particular, our rst-stage estimates would be based on a selected
sample - the population of those not dying. In order to calculate valid instrumental variables estimates of the eect
of education on mortality, one needs to estimate the rst-stage regressions before cohorts have experienced any
15Finally, since the month of birth information provided on the death certicate is reported by a
relative of the deceased, it may be measured with error. Any such error would bias our mortality
estimates towards zero. For at least two reasons, we do not think this type of error drives our
ndings. First, while measurement error in date of birth is likely largest for people that die when
they are very old, the oldest people in our analysis are 69. Second, the mortality estimates that we
obtain using administrative mortality data are comparable to the estimates that we obtain using
Census data and measuring deaths using reductions in cohort size. Since Census information on
month of birth is self-reported, it should be free of this type of measurement error.
B First-stage analyses
We use Health Survey of England (HSE) data to estimate our rst-stage and instrumental variables
regressions. Begun in 1991, the HSE is an annual survey that combines a questionnaire-based
component with objective information (such as measured blood pressure) obtained from a nurse
visit. We pool all waves of these data from 1991 through 2004 to give us large samples of roughly
20,000 adults born in a 15-year interval around each compulsory school law change. In addition
to basic demographic information such as gender and age, these questionnaires include all of the
variables needed to estimate equation (1): month of birth, year of birth and age left full-time
education. Age left full-time education is not the same as completed years of education, but for
our purposes we can view these as equivalent (see Appendix B for a discussion of this point).
Because we estimate these models using data obtained over the period 1991-2004, any mortality
eects of these laws could, potentially, bias these rst-stage estimates. This concern applies to
our estimates of both the 1947 and 1972 compulsory school changes. Since our mortality analysis
suggests that these changes had, at best, small mortality eects, we would not expect any education-
based selection into the HSE data. Indeed, we nd that the fraction of the birth cohort observed in
the HSE is smooth through the April 1 1933 and the September 1 1957 thresholds (not reported).
C Health analyses
The HSE is our main source of health data. Since the HSE contains both health measures and
measures of completed education, we can also use it to provide instrumental variables estimates of
health eects of the additional education. These selection biases have been ignored in prior instrumental variables
calculations. They do not aect our analysis as we nd no eects of education on mortality.
16the eects of education on these health measures. To gain more precision, we also use health survey
data from the General Household Survey (GHS) and the 1991 and 2001 U.K. Censuses. The GHS,
also used by Oreopoulos (2006), is an annual survey of over 13,000 households in Great Britain that
includes information on demographics (including month of birth from 1986 to 1996), household
composition, employment, education and health. The Censuses cover the entire population of
England and Wales hence these generate very precise estimates. The Censuses include standard
questions on self-reported health and illness prevalence, but no questions on completed education
(or wages). As such, we cannot use them to generate instrumental variables estimates of the health
eects of education.
VI Results
We report our results in three subsections. These correspond to the three steps of our empirical
strategy, described above. We begin with the eects of the compulsory schooling law changes on
educational attainment. We then report our estimates of the eects of the law changes on mortality.
Finally, we report our estimates of the eects of the additional education induced by the law changes
on other measures of health and health behaviors.
A The Impacts of the Compulsory Schooling Changes on Education
To examine the eect of the law changes on educational attainment, we begin by graphing the
relationship between birth cohort and the probability of completing less than nine and less than
ten years of education (Figure 2). All panels of this graph present averages by month of birth.
The vertical bars denote the appropriate birth cohort cuto for the relevant compulsory schooling
change. Superimposed onto these graphs are the tted linear trends and estimated discontinuities
obtained from estimation of equation (1) without covariates.
The 1947 change reduced the fraction of individuals completing nine or fewer years of education
by around 0.5. The 1972 change decreased the fraction completing ten or fewer years of education
by around 0.25. Table 1 quanties these relationships. The Table reports two estimates of equation
(1) for each dependent variable. The rst estimate is that displayed in Figure 2, obtained from
estimation of equation (1) without covariates. The second estimate comes from a model that
regression-adjusts for month-of-birth dummies, year- and month-of-survey dummies and a third-
order polynomial in age. We would not expect educational outcomes to display an age prole
17(conditional on month of birth) because for most respondents, completed education should be
xed from the early twenties onwards. Nevertheless, the age prole adjustment potentially removes
idiosyncratic noise. It is more important to remove the age prole when analyzing health outcomes.
There are three main points to note about these estimates. First, the eects of the law changes
are precisely estimated.28 The t-statistics for the years of education regressions are in excess of six
for the 1947 change and ve for the 1972 change. For the dichotomous outcomes, the t-statistics are
even higher. The magnitudes of the t-statistics suggest that these changes are powerful instruments
for educational attainment. Despite his use of year-of-birth comparisons, the rst-stage estimates of
Oreopoulos (2006) for the 1947 change are similar. Oreopoulos (2006) does not examine the eects
of the second reform. Second, as expected, regression-adjustment for age and survey year/month
does not aect the point estimates. Third, the law changes generated only weak spillovers to higher
levels of educational attainment: the 1947 change generated a small increase in the fraction of girls
that completed ten or fewer years of education but had little impact on the corresponding fraction
for boys; the 1972 change had no eects on the fractions completing eleven or fewer years, although
these estimates are less precise. To a rst approximation therefore, one can view these law changes
as forcing students that would previously have left at the earliest opportunity to stay in school for
one more year.
One nal point concerning Figure 2 and Table 1 relates to compliance. A small fraction of those
subject to the new laws appear to complete less education than these new laws required. For the
1972 law change, this is particularly marked among those born in June, July, and August. We
discuss the sources and implications of this pattern in Appendix B. To summarize, we conclude
that the pattern should have little impact on our estimates since it is quite regular and hence can
be controlled for via the inclusion of post-change month-of-birth controls.
More generally, our estimates are specic to the population of "compliers," those whose edu-
cational attainment was aected by these law changes (Imbens & Angrist, 1994). As noted by
Oreopoulos (2006), while the compliers make up only a fraction of the aected cohorts (0.5 in 1947,
0.25 in 1972), this fraction is large relative to other analyses based on compulsory school laws. For
example, Lleras-Muney (2005) estimates that U.S. compulsory schooling changes enacted at the
28In estimates discussed later, we are able to combine the HSE estimates with those from the GHS to estimate an
even tighter rst stage.
18beginning of the 20th century aected less than ve percent of the relevant cohorts.
B The Impacts of the Compulsory Schooling Changes on Mortality
Having shown that the compulsory school law changes aected educational attainment, we turn to
their impact on mortality. We begin with an analysis of the impact of the 1947 change. We then
analyze the impact of the 1972 change.
i Evidence from the 1947 change
We begin our mortality analysis by reporting estimates based on the hazard approach described
earlier. In our logit specication we include the post-change dummy D, a full set of age-in-months
dummies and a fully-interacted linear polynomial in month of birth.29,30 Likelihood ratio tests
suggest that a linear polynomial is sucient, since tests of this model against one that includes
month-of-birth dummies (i.e., a completely exible model) yield p-values exceeding 0.05.
In the rst column of estimates in Table 2, we report the log-odds ratios for the post-change
dummy by sex. A log-odds ratio exceeding one suggests that post-reform cohorts have higher mor-
tality risk; a ratio below one suggests that post-reform cohorts are at lower risk of dying.31 The
estimates for men imply that the 1947 change led to a 1.1 percent increase in the likelihood of dying
in every month of the 1970-2007 period. The estimates for women imply that the 1947 change led
to a 0.4 percent increase in the likelihood of dying.
Although these positive eects are counterintuitive, they are statistically insignicant for women
and only marginally signicant for men (at the 5 percent level). More importantly, they are also
very small. Indeed, in the graphical display of our cross-sectional analysis, discussed below, we do
not observe a discontinuity in mortality starting with the 1933 quarter 2 birth cohort for males
or females. We therefore interpret the positive, statistically-signicant eect for males as a conse-
quence of a type I error. An alternative explanation is that the additional earnings generated by the
additional education increased engagement in unhealthy behaviors such as alcohol consumption.
We turn next to the estimates of the probability of dying between certain ages, following the
29A cross-validation procedure for choosing the appropriate bandwidth for this type of non-linear model has not
yet been developed. We therefore use the bandwidth suggested by our analysis of the probability of death between
ages 45 and 69. Our estimates exhibit little variation across dierent bandwidths.
30When we estimate the pooled regression, we also include a male dummy variable in the logit specication.
31Furthermore, we interpret the size of the estimates as percents. A log-odds ratio of 1.038 would suggest that
relative to individuals born immediately prior to April 1, 1933, individuals born immediately following April 1, 1933
had a 3.8 percent higher likelihood of dying in each month of the 1970-2007 period.
19approach outlined by equation (3). This approach is, arguably, more transparent than the hazard
analysis, since these estimates can be represented graphically. We start with a crude mortality
measure: the probability of dying between age 45 and 69, displayed in Figure 3.32,33 The graph
shows the expected negative relationship between these probabilities and birth cohort, but there is
no apparent discontinuity in this outcome for the cohorts born in quarter 2 of 1933 and later. In
fact, the associated point estimates are again positive, although small and generally not statistically
signicant. These estimates are consistent with the hazard estimates, neither of which provide any
evidence that the compulsory schooling change reduced mortality.
To examine this relationship further, Figure 4 plots death rates over 5-year age intervals. Due
to space constraints, we present gures for men and women together. Later, we provide separate
estimates by sex. Again, the graphs suggest that there was no systematic reduction in death rates
for the cohorts born after 1933 quarter 2.
The remainder of Table 2 presents regression discontinuity estimates by sex and age group. In
the presence of a mortality-reducing eect of education, we would expect these estimates to be
negative. There is only one negative estimate. Most of these estimates are small and statistically
insignicant. For instance, the 95 percent condence interval for the overall death rate for ages 45
to 69 spans from -0.80 (a 0.4 percent decline) to 7.98 (a 4.35 percent rise).
Since only 20 percent of the relevant cohort died between the ages of 45 and 69, an obvious
question is whether the cohorts are old enough for us to detect sizable eects. There are two rea-
sons why we think they are. First, Lleras-Muney (2005) nds that the mortality-reducing eects
of education are largest between the ages of 35 and 64. Second, a simulation exercise (described
in Appendix E) suggests that our methods would detect relatively small eects. For example, if
a year of education improved life expectancy by 1.5 years, an eect consistent with Lleras-Muney
(2005), we would expect to observe eects on mortality rates among the 45-69 age group of around
-20. An eect of this size is much larger than the eects reported in Table 2.
Education may have dierent eects on mortality associated with dierent diseases. For example,
Cutler et al. (2006) nd that the education gradient in health is steeper for knowledge-intensive,
32The earliest age we observe the 1947 cohort is age 33 in 1970, and the latest age is 74, but since we also use
several younger and older cohorts in the analysis, we look at mortality between 45 and 69.
33In addition to a fully-interacted linear trend in the running variable, these regressions include quarter-of-birth
controls (i.e., quarter 1, quarter 2, and quarter 3 dummies) designed to capture any seasonality in this outcome.
Our estimates are qualitatively similar whether or not these are included.
20technology-intensive diseases (e.g., diabetes). To explore whether our aggregated analysis obscures
eects on particular types of diseases, Figure 5 considers the probability of dying between ages 45
and 64 from three dierent disease classes: respiratory, circulatory and deaths from other causes.
Table 3 presents the corresponding point estimates.34 For all these classes of death, there is no
discrete downward shift beginning with the 1933 quarter 2 cohort.
Overall, we nd that the additional education induced by the 1947 compulsory school law change
had little impact on mortality. Yet on this evidence alone, we would be cautious about drawing
more general conclusions about the relationship between education and mortality. That is be-
cause these eects may be specic to one cohort, and this cohort experienced the Great Depression
and the Second World War, factors potentially aecting the life trajectories of its members. We
therefore turn next to the 1972 change in compulsory schooling laws.
ii Evidence from the 1972 change
The 1972 change generates another education quasi-experiment that can be used to identify the
causal eect of education on health. Since this change occurred during less turbulent times, we
can use it to assess the generalizability of the 1947 estimates. The caveat is that there are other
reasons, besides these wider circumstances, why the two quasi-experiments might yield dierent
estimates. First, the later change aected educational attainment at a slightly higher point in
the education distribution. The eects of education on health could be non-linear.35 Second, we
observe the cohorts aected by the 1972 change at dierent ages than those aected by the 1947
change. This is relevant if the health eects of education vary over the life-cycle. Nevertheless,
since both changes extended the period of compulsory schooling, we might expect their eects to
work through similar channels and to have broadly similar impacts.
The rst column of Table 4 reports estimates based on the hazard approach. For men, we are able
to rule out eects of -0.002 percent at the 5 percent signicance level. Even after dividing these
reduced-from estimates by the rst-stage estimates, the eects are quite small. In contrast, for
34Since our data by cause are only available through 2004, we can only look at general-cause deaths up to age 64.
The most common circulatory diseases resulting in death are heart disease and stroke. The most common pulmonary
diseases resulting in death are pneumonia (nearly a half of all cases), cancers and chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease (which includes chronic bronchitis and emphysema).
35For the United States, Cutler & Lleras-Muney (2006) note that for education levels below 10 years of schooling,
some outcomes (e.g., mortality) appear to be linearly related to years of schooling while others do not. For education
beyond 10 years of schooling, the health returns to education appear to be constant.
21women, the eects are consistent with health-improving eects of education and are on the verge of
statistical signicance at the 5 percent level. These eects imply a much larger eect for women than
for men but, for both sexes, are substantially smaller than the estimates of Lleras-Muney (2005).
Turning to the cross-sectional approach, Figure 6 plots 20-44 year old mortality rates by birth
cohort. Relative to Figures 3-5, there are more data points in these graphs. That is because for
these later cohorts, we have birth cohort sizes by month of birth and hence can analyze the eects of
the 1972 change at the month-of-birth level. This is ideal, since unlike the 1947 change (introduced
on 1 April), the 1972 change (introduced on 1 September) cuts across a birth quarter. The graph
provides little evidence for any discontinuity in mortality rates beginning with the September 1957
cohort.
The remainder of Table 4 provides regression discontinuity estimates of these mortality eects by
age group; Figure 7 provides the corresponding graphs. For men, the eects are generally positive.
For women, the absence of any eects on the probability of dying between ages 20 and 44 appears
to mask the possibility of some negative eects on the probability of dying at younger ages, but
only one of these estimates is statistically signicant. These eects are consistent with the hazard
estimates. The estimates are small in percentage point terms as the probability of dying between
20 and 44 is low (roughly 2 to 3 percent of the relevant cohorts die between these ages), but in
percent terms, some of the eects are modest. For example, our estimate of the eect of the 1972
change on the probability of dying between ages 20 and 24 is consistent with that predicted by a
1.5 year increase in life expectancy. Against that, we estimate smaller eects at slightly older ages
and no or positive eects beyond age 35. Overall, these mortality estimates for the 1972 change
suggest little or no eects.
C The Impacts of Education on Other Health Outcomes
Since we nd little evidence of any mortality impacts of these laws, an analysis of their impacts on
various survivor outcomes should be free of mortality-driven sample selection biases. We consider
two types of outcomes: measures of health, including both subjective and objective measures, and
measures of health behaviors, including self-reports of smoking, drinking, diet and exercise. Some
of these health measures are strong predictors of mortality (Idler & Benyamini, 1997), and some of
these health behaviors (e.g., smoking) are known causes of morbidity and mortality.
22i Evidence from the 1947 change
We begin our analysis by reporting estimates of the impacts of the 1947 law change on measures
of health. We then turn to measures of health behavior.
Health measures
Using pooled HSE data (all waves from 1991 to 2004), panel A of Table 5a presents least squares
estimates of the eects of education on various self-reported health measures. To ensure these are
based on a sample comparable to the one for whom the reforms had the biggest eect, we use
individuals that are born in the United Kingdom, are born within 60 months of the cuto and
leave full-time education at or before age sixteen. We began by estimating separate models for men
and women but did not reject the hypothesis that eects were the same for men and women. We
therefore chose to pool the data and include a male dummy.36
The least squares estimates (the column labeled "OLS") suggest that an additional year of edu-
cation reduces the probability of being in fair or worse health by roughly nine percentage points,37
reduces the probability of reporting a longstanding illness by three percentage points38 and reduces
the probability of reporting reduced activity by two percentage points. The least squares eects
are, respectively, 25%, 5% and 10% of the pre-change means.
The regression discontinuity estimates of the reduced-form eects of the compulsory schooling
change on these outcomes (the column labeled "RF w/o X") are small. For example, the estimated
eect on self-reporting being in fair or worse health is -0.008. The estimated eects on self-reporting
having a long-standing illness and self-reporting reduced activity both take the wrong sign, but are
close to zero. Figure 8 gives a graphical representation of the reduced-form estimates for "fair or
worse health". Moving from the left to the right of these graphs, we see that health outcomes
become more favorable across cohorts. This is because these cohorts have beneted from secular
improvements in health (e.g., technological progress) and because they are younger when inter-
viewed. We do not however see a marked change in health outcomes among those just aected by
36By pooling we generate larger cell sizes and more precise estimates of the impacts of the ROSLAs. It is worth
bearing in mind that while sample sizes in the HSE are relatively large (around 300 individuals per month of birth
cohort), they are tiny in comparison to those underlying the mortality analyses, which eectively contain the entire
population hence are around 100 times larger.
37The precise question is "How is your health in general? Would you say it was...".
38The question is "Do you have any long-standing illness, disability or inrmity. By long-standing I mean anything
that has troubled you over a period of time or is likely to trouble you over a period of time."
23the compulsory schooling changes.
Turning back to panel A of Table 5a, we see that regression adjustment for pre-determined co-
variates has little eect on the reduced-form estimates (the column labeled "RF"). These covariates
include a exible function of age, designed to remove the age prole in these outcomes. In the nal
column we present instrumental variables estimates of the eect of an additional year of education
on these outcomes (column labeled "IV"). These estimates are statistically indistinguishable from
zero, although only the estimate for "fair or bad health" is precise enough to reject the least squares
estimates.39 Overall, while the least squares estimates suggest large health eects of education, the
instrumental variables estimates suggest that the additional education induced by the 1947 change
did not improve health, at least as measured by these self-reported outcomes.
Objective health measures may be more precise indicators of underlying health status. The HSE
contains some of these, obtained from a nurse visit to consenting respondents. In panel B of Table
5a we report estimates of the eects of education on the probability of being obese (Body Mass
Index (BMI) > 30)), the probability of being overweight (BMI > 25), the incidence of hypertension
and blood pressure.40 The least squares estimates suggest that education has benecial eects on
these outcomes, although eect sizes are generally smaller than they were for self-reported health.41
The reduced-form and instrumental variables estimates again suggest no obvious relationship be-
tween education and these outcomes. In particular, none of the instrumental variables estimates
are statistically signicant and these frequently take the "wrong" sign.
Health behaviors
While the above analysis suggests that the additional education generated by the 1947 compul-
sory school law change did not aect health as measured when these cohorts were in their sixties,
it may generate health eects at older ages. For that reason, it is interesting to assess whether this
additional education aected health behaviors, since these might manifest themselves as poorer
later-life health and higher later-life mortality rates.
Starting with smoking, we classify respondents into three mutually exclusive and exhaustive
39Here we treat the least squares estimates as a xed quantity instead of a random variable. That is, we are not
conducting a Hausman test.
40We base our blood pressure measure on diastolic blood pressure, but our results are similar when using systolic
blood pressure.
41These ndings are consistent with the analysis of Johnston et al. (2009), who also nd smaller least squares
estimates for objective measures of health.
24categories - "currently smoking", "started smoking, stopped smoking" and "never smoked" - and
consider impacts on "currently smoking" and "ever smoked". The rst is probably most informative,
since a large fraction of the aected cohorts report ever smoking.42 The "currently smoking"
question relates only to cigarettes while the "ever smoked" question includes pipes and cigars. Table
5b reports estimates of the impacts of education on these outcomes. For "currently smoking" the
least squares estimates are very large: an extra year of education appears to reduce the probability of
smoking by ve percentage points, around one quarter of the pre-change mean. For "ever smoked",
the least squares estimate is smaller (an extra year reduces this probability by three percentage
points), although still statistically signicant.43
For both smoking measures, the reduced-form estimates are small and statistically indistinguish-
able from zero. Figure 8 presents the associated graph for the reduced-form impact on "currently
smoking". For both smoking measures the instrumental variables estimates are also statistically
insignicant. The condence interval associated with the "currently smoking" IV estimate almost
excludes the least squares estimate.
Looking further down Table 5b, the least squares estimates suggest that education is associated
with healthy behaviors such as eating fruit and vegetables, taking vitamins and getting exercise.
The least squares estimate does however suggest that education is associated with higher alcohol
consumption. Again, the reduced-form estimates typically cannot be distinguished from zero and
the instrumental variables estimates are less precise. As discussed below, we pursue various strate-
gies to try to obtain more precise instrumental variables estimates of the eects of education on
these various outcomes.
At this point, it is worth noting that if the eects of drinking on health were large enough, and if
the reform had positive eects on drinking, these might explain why the reform had small eects on
health overall. The evidence suggests, however, that the health impacts of drinking are moderate.
For example, Sturm (2002), using a cross-sectional approach, concludes that the health risks of
problem drinking are half those of smokers.
Extensions
42This might be because the "ever smoking" denition includes pipe and cigar smoking.
43Others have argued that education might increase the probability of using soft drugs (Cutler & Lleras-Muney,
2006). Such an eect could be one reason why the least squares estimate is smaller for "started smoking" than
"currently smoke".
25We pursue three approaches to generate more precise instrumental variables estimates of the
eects of education on health. First, since several variables appearing in the HSE also appear
the General Household Survey (GHS), we pool data from the GHS and HSE. Second, we follow
an approach used by Katz et al. (2007) and estimate education impacts on summary measures of
health and health behaviors. Third, to assess robustness more generally, we estimate the health
impacts of the additional education generated by the 1972 change (in the next section).
The pooled GHS-HSE estimates are reported in Appendix Table A1a. As expected, these are
more precise than those based solely on the HSE. Nevertheless, the point estimates are similar.
The least squares estimates suggest strong correlations between education and self-reported health
and health behaviors. The instrumental variables estimates suggest that omitted variables likely
drive these correlations. For all but two of the six outcomes reported (currently drink and currently
smoke), the IV estimates can rule out eects the size of the OLS estimates.
We report summary estimates based on the approach of Katz et al. (2007) in Appendix Table
A1b. For example, we estimate education impacts on a summary measure of self-reported health
based on the individual items "health bad," "long-standing illness" and "reduced activity." A
simple way of estimating eects on this summary measure would be to take a simple average of the
eects on the individual items. There are two dierences between this simple approach and the
approach taken by Katz et al. (2007) and followed here. First, to ensure they are comparable, the
individual items are standardized (via the sample standard deviation in the items) before they are
averaged. Second, to enable the appropriate calculation of the variance of this summary measure,
the individual item eects are estimated in a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) system. This
generates the same point estimates as would be generated if the individual eects were estimated
separately but ensures that the individual sampling variances account for the covariance across the
individual estimates. The sampling variance of the summary measure is then a function of the
sampling variances of the individual items obtained via SUR estimation. Under the null hypothesis
that the standardized summary measure is zero, the standard t-statistic can be computed as the
standardized summary estimate divided by the square root of this adjusted sampling variance.
For the summary measures of self-reported health, objectively-reported health and smoking, the
least squares estimates are large and the instrumental variables estimates are small and statistically
26indistinguishable from zero. We can rule out eects the size of the OLS estimates for the self-
reported health measures. For the summary measure of food consumption and exercise, both the
least squares and instrumental variables estimates are small and positive, but both are imprecise
and neither are statistically distinguishable from zero at the ve percent level.
ii Evidence from the 1972 change
The health impacts of the 1972 change are presented in Tables 6a and 6b. The results for health out-
comes (Table 6a) are broadly consistent with those obtained for the 1947 change (Table 5a). Indeed,
since the population aected by the 1947 change is approximately 25 years older than the popula-
tion aected by the 1972 change when interviewed for the Health Survey of England (between 1991
and 2004), it is remarkable how close are the two sets of estimates. For example, the least squares
estimate of the eect of education of the probability of self-reporting being in fair or bad health is
around nine percentage points for those aected by the 1947 change and around seven percentage
points for those aected by the 1972 change. All of the other least squares estimates take the same
sign across the two sets of estimates and are often close in magnitude. While the reduced-form and
instrumental variables estimates are less close in magnitude, and while the signs often dier between
the two samples, nearly all estimates are statistically insignicant in both samples. For no outcome
could a statistical test reject the hypothesis that the instrumental variables estimates are the same
across the two samples. However, the estimates are measured with less precision for the 1972 cohort.
The results for health behaviors (Table 6b) are also consistent with those obtained for the 1947
analysis (Table 5b). The main exception is the least squares estimate of the impact of education on
currently smoking (much larger in the 1972 sample), but the sample means are also higher in this
sample. The more important point is that across both samples, the instrumental variables estimates
suggest that the additional education induced by both laws had smaller impacts on the probability
of smoking than suggested by the OLS relationships. The same conclusion can be drawn for the
other outcomes presented in Tables 5b and 6b.
Similar to Appendix Tables A1a and A1b, Appendix Tables A2a and 2b present pooled analyses
(i.e., using both the GHS and the HSE) and summary estimates of the health eects of the 1972
change. Again, pooling datasets generates larger samples and, typically, more precise estimates.
For example, the condence interval around the pooled estimate of the eect of an additional year
27of education on the probability of being in fair or bad health now excludes the least squares es-
timate. Similarly, the summary estimates are often statistically indistinguishable from zero, even
though some of the individual estimates are signicant.
iii Summary and Evidence from Census Data
Taken together, these estimates paint a relatively consistent picture. The least squares estimates
suggest that education has large eects on both health and health behaviors. None of the instru-
mental variables estimates point to a strong and persistent eect of education on health.
The caveat here is that these instrumental variables estimates are not always precise, even after
we have pooled HSE and GHS data and even after we have estimated impacts on summary out-
comes. As a result, while the weight of this evidence suggests that the additional education induced
by these compulsory schooling changes does not aect health, one can nd individual estimates that
are statistically signicant (e.g., for the "eat vegetables daily" outcome for the 1947 change, for the
"reduced activity" outcome for the 1972 change) or nd estimates that suggest the eects of the
1947 and 1972 changes work in opposite directions (e.g., the "obese" and "overweight" outcomes).
The estimates are even less precise when estimated separately by sex. We combined data for men
and women to improve precision and because, for most outcomes, we could not reject that the male
and female coecients were the same.44
We would like to generate more precise estimates and we would like to generate precise estimates
for men and women separately. We pursue two additional strategies with these goals in mind.
First, to improve precision, we combine the two compulsory schooling changes by pooling all HSE
respondents born between 1920 and 1970. We then capture cohort trends with a exible age prole
and use both compulsory schooling changes as instruments for completed education. Assuming
the cohort trends are suciently exible and assuming that the two compulsory schooling changes
generate similar health eects of education, these combined IV estimates should be more precise
than the separate IV estimates. As seen in Appendix Tables A3a and A3b, the combined IV es-
timates follow the same pattern as the separate IV estimates, but are more precise than those.45
44Power calculations suggest that if we separate men and women, we would not have sucient power to detect eect
sizes of more than 10 percent for outcomes for which the base means are 0.2 or smaller. Details available upon request.
45Only the smoking outcomes suggest eects in the direction of the least squares estimates and these are sensitive
to functional form. This is not entirely surprising since there are strong (non-monotonic) cohort trends in smoking
behaviors. This suggests that this pooled 50-year analysis is not appropriate for smoking outcomes. This problem
does not aect the separate analyses of the 1947 and 1972 reforms.
28For example, we can rule out reductions in the probability of being in fair or poor health larger
than three percentage points o a mean of 25 percent. For the outcomes of health fair or bad,
long illness, reduced activity, obese, and BMI, the condence intervals of the IV estimates exclude
the OLS estimate. For some of the remaining outcomes - overweight, hypertension, and diastolic
blood pressure - the OLS eects are small. For the rest, the IV eects imply that an extra year of
education reduces the likelihood of those outcomes by less than 10 percent.
Second, to assess separate eects for men and women, we use data on self-reported health from
the 1991 and 2001 Censuses. Since these censuses provide enormous sample sizes, they generate
much more precise estimates than survey-based analyses. Table 7 presents reduced-form estimates
of the impacts of the two compulsory schooling changes on these self-reported outcomes. The rst
two columns present reduced-form estimates with and without age controls; the next two columns
present reduced-form estimates separately for men and women. Since the Census does not contain
education information, least squares and instrumental variables estimates are not presented.
Generally speaking, these reduced-form eects are very small. The estimates in the rst two
rows of panel A suggest that the 1947 compulsory schooling change had a small but statistically
signicant impact on self-reported health. For example, the compulsory schooling change is seen
to reduce the probability of self-reporting having "fair or bad" health and the probability of self-
reporting having "bad" health by 0.4 percentage points. Since the 1947 change was associated with a
completed schooling increase of 0.5 years, this implies that an extra year of education reduced these
probabilities by around 0.8 percentage points. As a point of reference, recall that the analogous
HSE-based least square estimate is 9 percentage points.46 The bottom two rows of panel A suggest
that the 1947 changes had no statistically signicant eects on the probability of self-reporting a
limiting long-term illness. When we estimate these regressions separately for men and women, the
estimates are broadly similar. Figure 9 gives graphical representations of these estimates.
The estimates in the rst two rows of panel B suggest that the 1947 and 1972 changes had similar
eects, although the 1972 estimates are less precise. For example, the reduced-form estimates
suggest that the 1972 change decreased the probability of being in "fair or bad" health by around
46The Census questions are slightly dierent from those in the Health Survey of England, hence one must be
careful about making direct comparisons. The general health question in the Census is: "Over the last twelve
months, would you say your health has been..." and allows respondents to respond "Good" "Fairly good" or "Not
good." The longstanding illness question is worded "Do you have any long-term illness, health problem or disability
which limits your daily activities or the work you can do? Include problems which are due to old age."
290.15 percentage points. Scaled up by a factor of 3.3 (the 1972 change increased years of education by
around 0.3, see Table 1), this suggests that an additional year of education reduces this probability
by around 0.5 percentage points o of a base of 31.43 percent, again a very small eect. Estimates
of the impact of the 1972 change on the probability of reporting being in bad health are smaller than
the estimates for the 1947 change. This may be because these cohorts are younger, hence are less
likely to report being in bad health (8.4% versus 17.7%). Estimates of the impacts of these changes
on the probability of self-reporting a limiting long-term illness are again statistically insignicant.
When the eects of the 1972 change are estimated separately for men and women, there is some
evidence to suggest larger eects on men, although even these census-based estimates are not pre-
cise enough to reject that these coecients are the same. See the bottom panel of Figure 9 for the
associated graphs. Overall, our analyses of the Census data suggests that the additional education
induced by the 1947 and 1972 changes had at best very small eects on self-reported health and
that these eects did not dier systematically between men and women.
VII Discussion
In this section, we discuss our estimates in light of the previous literature. We then propose several
explanations for our null ndings.
A Relation to the Previous Literature
The most closely-related study to ours is Lleras-Muney (2005). She uses U.S. compulsory school
laws to identify the eects of education on a census-based measure of mortality.47 Her estimates
suggest that an additional year of education has a relatively large eect on mortality, reducing
10-year mortality rates by roughly three percentage points o a base mortality rate of about 10
percent.
Since we estimate eects on a dierent dependent variable (the probability of death over various
age intervals), our results cannot be directly compared with these. To obtain comparable esti-
mates, we construct a 10-year mortality rate using Census data for 1991 and 2001. Specically, for
each month-of-birth cohort, we measure mortality between 1991 and 2001 as one minus the 2001
population count divided by the 1991 population count. We then use these data to estimate the
47She measures the mortality rate of cohort c between 1950 and 1960 as one minus the fraction of the cohort alive
in 1950 that was also alive in 1960.
30impact of the school leaving changes on these outcomes (these regressions are weighted by initial
population size).
This exercise yields much smaller estimates than those obtained by Lleras-Muney (2005). For
example, we estimate that for men, being born after April 1933 reduces the 1991-2001 mortality rate
by roughly 0.2 percentage points, around 1.5 percent of the mean mortality rate among those born
just before April 1933 (15.1 percent). Even if we scale this estimate by the rst-stage estimate (i.e.,
multiply the estimate by two), it is still much smaller than the least squares and the instrumental
variables estimates reported by Lleras-Muney (2005). For women, the regression discontinuity
reduced-form estimate is 0.2 percentage points (o a base mortality rate of 8.5 percent) and is not
statistically distinguishable from zero.
There are several reasons why our estimates might be smaller than those reported by Lleras-
Muney (2005). First, the compulsory school laws are dierent across the two countries. In particu-
lar, while the compulsory school laws studied in the U.S. are used in combination with child labor
restrictions and compulsory attendance laws, the British laws refer only to school attendance. If
changes to child labor laws aect whether children work in potentially dangerous environments, we
might expect the U.S. laws to have larger eects on health.
Second, the laws were less binding in the U.S. Prior to the law changes, typically around ve
percent of the relevant U.S. cohorts dropped out at the earliest possible age (Lleras-Muney, 2005).
This contrasts with the large fractions that dropped out at the earliest possible age in Britain.
Below we discuss whether the size of the education eects induced by the British law changes can
explain the small eects that we nd.
Third, there are important dierences in the methods used in the two studies. In particular, since
the British school leaving laws are made at the national level, and since they generate sharp changes
in educational attainment, we can use regression discontinuity methods that can accommodate ex-
ible cohort trends in health outcomes. In contrast, Lleras-Muney (2005) uses dierence-in-dierence
methods to exploit cohort and state variation in compulsory schooling laws. This approach relies
on the stronger assumption that these laws are uncorrelated with state-specic trends in these
outcomes.
Although this is the rst paper to use the British compulsory schooling changes to assess the
mortality eects of education, Oreopoulos (2006) and Silles (2009) have used these changes to as-
31sess the eects of education on self-reported health (as measured in the General Household Survey
(GHS)). Oreopoulos (2006) used a regression discontinuity approach at the year-of-birth level. His
estimates using the 1947 reform suggest large education eects on self-reported health. For exam-
ple, his instrumental variable for the eect of an extra year of education on the probability of being
in poor health is -0.032 (o of a mean of 0.150). In results not reported, we show that the use of
year-of-birth comparisons using our data can yield erroneously large IV estimates and thus explain
our diering results.48 Silles (2009) used both compulsory schooling changes in an instrumental
variables procedure that pools across a wide range of cohorts. She nds large eects of education
on self-reported health, often much larger than the corresponding least squares estimates. Since
her approach is similar to the one used by Harmon & Walker (1995) to assess the earnings eects
of these changes, it is subject to the same concerns regarding cohort trends.49
B How Can We Explain These Results?
It is not easy to account for our results. It is, for example, hard to argue that the British system of
health care weakens what would otherwise be large health returns. First, while the National Health
Service (NHS) does provide universal health insurance, the system is known to be inequitable and
open to manipulation by more-educated patients. While the combination of gatekeepers and re-
source constraints should in theory limit the extent to which more-educated patients can shop for
specialists and treatments, more-educated patients can work this system by, for example, persuading
their general practitioner (GP) to refer them for treatment or, if that fails, switching GPs or going
directly to a specialist (Lyall, 2008).50 Even if the NHS did serve to weaken health returns some-
what, we would still expect more-educated patients to engage in less risky behaviors (e.g., smoking)
and more ecient self-management (Goldman & Smith, 2002). Consistent with this hypothesis,
some evidence suggests that highly-educated parents in the U.K. are more responsive to changes in
medical knowledge concerning the perceived safety of childhood vaccines (Anderberg et al., 2008).
48In later work, Oreopoulos (2008), using a dierent sample, estimates that the health returns to education are
much smaller than those reported in Oreopoulos (2006).
49Silles (2009) checks robustness by comparing average outcomes among cohorts born three years either side of the
relevant cohorts. This comparison supports the IV estimates, although it will also be biased by pre-existing trends.
50Until recently, to benet from new treatments, patients rst had to be referred to a specialist by a GP. The
specialist then decided whether to treat the patient and patients requiring treatment were placed on a waiting list
(patients could avoid waiting by opting for private treatment). See Aaron & Schwartz (1984) for a comparison of
the U.K. and U.S. health systems.
32It is also hard to attribute these results to the content of these additional years of education.
One might worry that the quality of these additional years was low, perhaps because they were not
accompanied by sucient new resources, and there are reports of children being taught in temporary
and overcrowded classrooms. Yet other commentary suggests that schools and teachers were well-
prepared for the extra years, in part because these changes were fully anticipated.51 Ultimately,
arguments based on the quality of the extra years are hard to reconcile with the economic returns
to these extra years.
Similarly, it is not clear why the wider circumstances facing aected cohorts - the Great Depres-
sion, the Second World War and the military service requirements - should have lowered the health
returns to the extra education induced by the 1947 change. To the extent that the Second World
War disrupted education, and to the extent that there are diminishing health returns to education,
we might expect the health returns to the additional year to be especially high. One can construct
stories as to why military service could weaken the health eects of education, but we estimated
that the 1947 change generated small health returns for women, who were not required to perform
military service. In the end, the consistency of our ndings across the two compulsory schooling
changes pushes against explanations based on the circumstances surrounding the 1947 change.
Our nal proposed explanations for these results center on the size of the aected populations.
In particular, because these changes aected large numbers of students (up to 50% of the relevant
cohort), they may not have changed these students' peer groups and may not have changed their
relative educational and economic performance. The idea that relative economic well-being aects
health has been much discussed in the literature; U.K. studies form the basis of much of the
evidence.52 If health depends on relative economic performance and the relevant comparison group
is the birth cohort, then we would not expect the compulsory schooling changes, which aected
entire birth cohorts, to improve health outcomes. As noted by Deaton & Paxson (1999), however,
the assumption that the birth cohort is the appropriate reference group is a strong one. For example,
in the case of the 1947 change, it means that cohorts born in April 1933 must take as their reference
group cohorts born in April 1933 through August 1933 (required to stay until age fteen) and not
cohorts born between September 1932 and March 1933 (able to leave at age fourteen). Since all of
51This information comes from the Times Educational Supplement on 5 April 1947.
52See the series of articles by Sir Michael Marmot, including Marmot (1994).
33these students were in the same academic cohort - hence would have taken classes together, played
on the same sports teams and so on - this seems like a strong assumption. As such, this explanation
may be unsatisfactory.
Another explanation could be based on the fact that these compulsory school changes are likely
to have generated only weak peer eects. In particular, because these changes aected so many
students, the aected students are likely to have left school with the same types of peers as the
unaected students. Since a range of studies (Gaviria & Raphael, 2001; Powell et al., 2005; Trogdon
et al., 2008; Duncan et al., 2005) suggest that teenage peers aect health outcomes and behaviors,
including the propensity to smoke and the probability of being overweight, the absence of teenage
peer eects could explain why education appears not to aect health in this setting. Weighing
against this explanation however is the likely impact of these compulsory school changes on adult
peer groups, especially workplace peer groups (to the extent that these changes aected earnings).
Since there is evidence suggesting that workplace peers might also aect health behaviors (Cutler
& Glaeser (2007)), the peer eects explanation seems somewhat ad hoc.
These explanations all assume that the health eects of education are large, and attribute
our null results to specic features of the British setting. But it is also possible that the health
eects of education are, generally, rather small. As education is likely determined by many of the
same factors that determine health, it may be dicult to isolate the causal eects of education.
In that case, identication strategies that rely on relatively weak assumptions, such as regression
discontinuity designs, may be especially fruitful. The only other regression discontinuity analysis of
education and mortality of which we are aware, Albouy & Lequien (2009), also nds small eects
on mortality, although their estimates are much less precise than ours. This is partly because the
French compulsory schooling changes had smaller eects on educational attainment (rst-stage t-
statistics 4 and 2) and partly because the mortality measure is survey-based, hence involves much
smaller samples. For data availability reasons, they do not consider non-mortality outcomes.
VIII Conclusion
While policies designed to improve population health often focus on reforms of health care systems,
a recent economics literature suggests that social policies may be useful alternative policy instru-
ments (e.g., Head Start (Ludwig & Miller, 2007), hospital desegregation (Almond et al., 2006)).
34One such policy is education policy. In the US, there is an explicit directive within the U.S. health
goals (i.e., US Healthy People) to raise the percent of students graduating from high school to
90 percent. In Britain, positive health eects have been cited among the advantages of a further
raising of the school-leaving age.
In this paper, we try to shed light on the extent to which these education policies could achieve
health goals. We show that the British compulsory schooling changes had dramatic eects on the
educational attainment of people born just days apart, but we nd that the health returns to this
extra education were, at best, small. We believe there is little reason to suppose that these ndings
reect specic features of the British compulsory schooling changes. Instead, the obvious explana-
tion is that these types of education interventions have generally small causal eects on health -
casting doubts on the health returns to these types of policies.
We stress that our ndings do not imply small health returns to all types of education interven-
tions. In particular, it is possible that interventions at dierent points in the education distribution
may generate larger health returns. For instance, de Walque (2007) and Grimard & Parent (2007)
nd that the Vietnam draft, which induced some individuals to go college, led to a decline in rates
of smoking. The possibly heterogeneous eects of education on health warrant further study.
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39Appendix A: Additional Robustness Checks
In this appendix, we present a number of additional tables and gures as robustness checks. We
discuss these tables and gures in the main text.
Appendix B: Measuring Years of Education
Throughout the paper we refer to the health impacts of "years of education." This is dened as
the age at which someone left full-time education minus ve. In this Appendix we describe why
years of education is measured in this way.
The starting point is the two survey datasets used in this paper: the Health Survey of England
(HSE) and the General Household Survey (GHS). These surveys ask respondents the following
questions:
HSE "At what age did you nish your continuous full-time education at school or college?"
GHS "How old were you when you left there, or when you nished or stopped your course?" [In
response to "Now thinking just of your full-time education, what type of school or college did you
last attend full-time?"]
The relationship between "age left full-time education" and "years of education" is governed
by English laws that determine the period of compulsory schooling (i.e., compulsory full-time
education). These laws state that students must have started school by the term after they turn
ve, although students have, traditionally, started school in the term in which they turned ve
(Sharp, 1997).53 Before 1962, these laws stated that students could not leave until the end of
the term in which they reached the minimum school leaving age. The U.K. education system has
three terms that run September-December, January-April, and April-July; exact dates vary by
school district. Hence, students born in October could not leave until Christmas, students born in
February could not leave until Easter and students born in May could not leave until July. After
1962, these laws stated that students born September-January could not leave until April, and
students born February-August could not leave until June. We illustrate the structure of these
laws in Appendix Figure B1a.
Based on these laws, we can calculate the minimum number of years and school terms of full-time
education that must have been completed by someone reporting leaving at the minimum leaving
age and the maximum number of years and school terms of full-time education that must have
been completed by someone reporting leaving at the minimum leaving age. This is illustrated in
Appendix Figure B1b. The minimum is always nine years and one term for those able to leave
before the 1947 change, ten years and one or two terms for those able to leave before the 1972
change and eleven years and one or two terms for the rest. Because respondents that report leaving
at the minimum leaving age may not have left at the rst available opportunity, the maximum is
greater than this. In particular, as seen in Appendix Figure B1b, respondents that report leaving
at the minimum leaving age could have completed one or two terms more than the minimum years
and school terms of full-time education that is completed by those that leave at the rst available
opportunity.
With this discussion in mind, we calculate "years of education" as the age left full-time education
minus ve. That X years of education then refers to X years and one term, X years and two terms
or X+1 years is not a problem: standard measures of completed years or grades of education share
the same property (i.e., we do not observe if fractions of grades are completed). In addition, any
53Sharp (1997) claims that these laws changed to accommodate earlier starting as pupil numbers fell in the 1970s.
This is conrmed by the survey evidence in Crawford et al. (2007).
40measurement error in years of education will bias downwards the estimated impact of the 1947 and
1972 law changes on educational attainment. This will bias upwards our two-stage least squares
estimates of the health eects of education. Since these estimates are consistently small, this
phenomenon is likely of little importance here.
Compliance post-1972
As seen in Figure 2, non-compliance among summer-borns increases after 1972. That is, after
1972, a large fraction of students born in June, July and August appear to leave full-time education
at age fteen or younger. In fact, while there may be a small amount of non-compliance throughout
the entire period studied, this post-1972 phenomenon is likely another consequence of the structure
of the laws.
Before 1972, when the minimum leaving age was fteen, students were required to stay in
full-time education until part way through grade nine. Like all grades except grade ten, grade
nine nishes in mid-July. Hence only students born in late July and August could have left at
fourteen (recall that students can leave at the end of the term in which they turn fteen, where
the summer term ends in July but for the purposes of the minimum leaving age is dened to run
until September). After 1972, when the minimum leaving age became age sixteen, students had
to stay until part way through grade ten. Grade ten nishes with the "O level" exam period and,
technically, students nish when they complete their last exam. Since the exam period starts in late
May and nishes in mid-June, starting in 1972, students born in late June, July, and August could
leave at fteen, technically younger than the minimum leaving age (sixteen). This can account for
the apparent increase in post-1972 non-compliance. Since the exam period is an unusual period of
schooling, even respondents that were in school throughout this period may report leaving in April.
This would further contribute to the apparent increase in non-compliance.
While this phenomenon could introduce some error into our measurement of years of education,
since all of our models control for quarter- or month-of-birth dummy variables, we think it will
have little impact on our analysis. Provided these month-of-birth or quarter-of-birth patterns are
consistent over time in the post-reform period, they will be controlled for in our regressions.54
As expected, the non-compliance phenomenon is much less striking once we regression adjust for
month or quarter of birth.
Appendix C: The Impacts of the Compulsory Schooling Changes on Earnings
In this Appendix, we report estimates of the earnings impacts of the two law changes. Although
other studies have estimated these impacts, our empirical specication diers from that used in
those studies, hence it is worth using it to re-analyze these impacts. The main dierence between
our specication and those used previously is the level at which across-cohort comparisons are
made. While the previous literature made these comparisons at the year-of-birth level, we make
these comparisons mainly at the month-of-birth level.
Previous estimates
Three studies have used these compulsory schooling law changes to estimate the earnings returns
to education: Harmon & Walker (1995), Oreopoulos (2006) and Devereux & Hart (2008). All use
year-of-birth comparisons. Harmon & Walker (1995) was the rst study to use the law changes to
generate instrumental variables estimates of the earnings returns to education. They use Family
Expenditure Survey (FES) data for the years 1978-1986 and focus on males aged 18-64. The
instruments in their model are dummy variables indicating the leaving age facing respondents
54We can allow for the seasonal patterns to be dierent pre- and post-reform and our estimates are qualitatively
unchanged.
41(fteen or sixteen) and they also control for survey year, age and age squared. They obtain
instrumental variables estimates of the eect of an additional year of education on log earnings of
0.15, much larger than the least squares estimate they calculate, 0.06. They obtain similar estimates
when they used an ordered probit to model years of education (to account for the categorical nature
of the data).
Oreopoulos (2006) notes that while Harmon & Walker (1995) control for age and survey year,
they may not take full account of cohort trends. Oreopoulos (2006) instead focuses on the 1947
change and accounts for cohort trends using a regression discontinuity approach that controls for
a fourth-order polynomial in year of birth. In addition to exploiting variation induced by the 1947
change, he also uses a dierence-in-dierence approach to exploit variation in the timing of this
British change relative to a comparable change that took place in Northern Ireland in the 1950s.
Using both approaches, he obtains large instrumental variables estimates for men and women,
comparable to those found by Harmon & Walker (1995). For example, using only British data, his
instrumental variables estimate of the eect of an additional year of education on log earnings is
0.15 with a standard error of 0.06 for men and 0.15 with a standard error of 0.13 for women. These
estimates are based on General Household Survey (GHS) data for the years 1983-1998; the sample
includes those born in Britain between 1921 and 1951 (aged 32-64 at the time of the surveys).
Devereux & Hart (2008) estimate earnings returns using regression discontinuity models based on
similar specications and estimation samples. Again, they only have access to data at the year-of-
birth level. The innovation in their study is the use of large samples of high-quality administrative
earnings data. For men, their estimates are much closer to conventional least squares estimates
(around 0.05-0.06); for women, their estimates are not statistically dierent from zero. Devereux &
Hart (2008) also report estimates using GHS data and GHS samples that correspond closely to the
sample based on the administrative data (excluding the self-employed, including foreign-born). For
men, they obtain instrumental variables estimates of the eect of an additional year of education
on weekly earnings of nearly 6 percent (standard error of 2 percent). For women the corresponding
estimates are 1.5 percent (standard error of 3 percent). They conclude that the earnings returns to
additional years of education may be closer to least squares estimates than was previously thought.
New estimates based on month of birth
Both the 1947 and 1972 law changes were introduced part way through the year. As such, we
estimate their earnings impacts using models at the month-of-birth level. Our estimation sample is
similar to that used by Devereux & Hart (2008), who also focus on British-only data. In particular,
we choose the sample of employees that were born in Britain between 1921 and 1945 and that report
working between 1 and 84 hours in the previous week. We also discard observations for which real
hourly wages (in 2001) are less than one pound or greater than 150 pounds. Unfortunately, month
of birth is not available in the GHS until 1985. This means that our samples are smaller than those
used by Devereux & Hart (2008). It also means that if we used the same age restrictions (between
ages 25 and 60), we would not observe outcomes for those born before 1925. We therefore expand
the age range to include those up to age 64; Harmon & Walker (1995) and Oreopoulos (2006) focus
on similar age ranges.
Appendix Table C1 reports estimates of the reduced-form eects of the 1947 change on both
earnings and on the probability of being observed working a certain number of hours (i.e., selecting
into the sample). We report separate estimates for men and women and for each outcome we report
estimates from two specications. In column (1) we report the estimate from a specication similar
to that used by Devereux & Hart (2008). That is, we use a global polynomial (over the same data
window) with a fourth-order polynomial in the running variable (in our case month of birth). In
42column (2) we report estimates based on a local linear regression approach.
If the treatment is dened as "years of primary and secondary schooling," as in Devereux &
Hart (2008), the instrumental variable estimates will be roughly twice as large as the reported
reduced-form estimates; if the treatment is dened as "years of full-time education" (i.e., primary
and secondary plus post-secondary education), the instrumental variables estimates will be closer
to three times as large. That is because, empirically, the law changes have a larger impact on
total years of primary and secondary schooling than they do on total years of full-time education.
Presumably that is because the extra year of secondary schooling is, for some, a substitute for
additional post-secondary education that would otherwise have been obtained. In the extreme
case, if all students that leave at the compulsory age pursue at least one year of post-secondary
education, and if students compelled to stay for an extra year in secondary school reduce by one
year the amount of post-secondary education pursued, the compulsory schooling change will have
large impacts on total years of primary and secondary schooling and no impact on total years of
full-time education.
The estimates presented in this Table suggest that for men, the 1947 change increased earnings
by nearly 8 log points. The global polynomial estimates (column (1)) are very close to the preferred
local linear estimates (column (2)). The local linear estimates are also fairly robust to bandwidth
choice. As Devereux & Hart (2008) also found, estimates for hourly earnings are slightly smaller
than those for weekly earnings. Appendix Figure C1 shows the graph corresponding to the weekly
earnings estimates. This gure superimposes tted lines from the local linear approach on the
scatterplot of raw data by month of birth.
It is tempting to use the point estimates in Appendix Table C1 to claim that the 1947 change
had earnings eects on the order of those of Harmon & Walker (1995) and Oreopoulos (2006).
We think that our samples are too small to pinpoint the precise magnitude of these eects. For
example, when we focus on the 90 per cent of this sample that works "normal" hours (which we
use the data to dene as 35-60), the estimates (second set of rows in Appendix Table C1) are much
closer to those reported by Devereux & Hart (2008). Instead, we view our results as consistent with
all of the previous literature in that we nd that this reform had statistically signicant eects on
male earnings.
Turning to women, we nd negative but not statistically signicant eects of the 1947 change
on earnings. Again, these eects are smaller when we focus on the 90 per cent of this sample with
regular hours (10-50, again dened using the data). These ndings are broadly in line with those
of Devereux & Hart (2008), who also nd negative but statistically insignicant estimates. To the
extent that we worry about these negative point estimates, it is important to note that the point
estimates for the "observed working" outcomes suggest that the 1947 change may have induced
some women to enter the labor force.
In Appendix Table C2, we present estimates of the eects of the 1972 change, not investigated by
Oreopoulos (2006) or Devereux & Hart (2008). Because this reform had smaller impacts on years
of education, around 0.2-0.3, it is harder to detect earnings eects in samples of this size. For ex-
ample, a reduced-form earnings eect of 0.015 would scale up to an instrumental variables estimate
of 0.06, roughly the size of the estimate found for the 1947 change by Devereux & Hart (2008). For
men, the point estimates exceed 0.015 using small bandwidths but not otherwise. There is however
some evidence of positive selection into the labor force for men, which might lead us to understate
these earnings eects. For women with regular hours, point estimates of the earnings eects are
much larger, although again imprecise. In addition, there is evidence that the 1972 change selected
women out of the labor force, which might bias these estimates upwards. Overall, given the size
of these GHS samples and the relatively small eects of the 1972 change, the earnings eects are
dicult to determine. Our data are more powerful for determining the health and mortality eects
43of the change, given the measurement error in earnings in these survey data.
Appendix D: Migration Issues
As emphasized in the data section, our mortality counts will exclude individuals who left Eng-
land. As there is some evidence from Malamud & Wozniak (2006) that higher-educated individuals
have higher propensities to migrate, migration could cause us to undercount deaths among the
post-reform cohorts relative to the pre-reform cohorts. Since this will bias us towards nding a
protective health eect of education, and since we nd little evidence of a mortality-reducing eect
of education, we are less concerned about migration biases than we would have been had we found
large mortality eects.
Nevertheless, we estimate the eect of the 1947 compulsory school reform on migration to the
United States.55 Of course, this analysis excludes other large receiving countries. In 2007, Aus-
tralia (59 thousand emigrants), Spain (21 thousand emigrants), France (20 thousand emigrants),
the United States (19 thousand emigrants), and Poland (18 thousand emigrants) were the top
ve intended countries for emigrants from the United Kingdom (ONS, 2008). Birth cohort details
needed for the research design are not available in the public-use versions of the Canadian and
Australian Censuses. Emigrants to the United States from the United Kingdom accounted for
roughly 6 percent of all emigrant ows in 2007 (ONS, 2008).
To test for migration dierences by cohort, we use the 1960, 1970, and 1980 U.S. Census data
and the 2005-2007 American Community Surveys (the only datasets with information on quarter of
birth). For each dataset, we present separate regression discontinuity estimates of the eect of the
reform on the fraction of individuals of each birth cohort appearing in the United States (Appendix
Table D1). Consistent with the results of Malamud & Wozniak (2006), nearly all of these estimates
are positive, although only 5 (out of 15) are statistically signicant at the 5 percent level. For the
male/female pooled regressions, the magnitudes vary from a 1-percent positive eect (1980 Census)
to a 24-percent positive eect (2006 ACS). Note that a 1.5 year eect on life expectancy would gen-
erate a -2 percentage point eect on mortality between the ages of 45 and 69 (see Appendix E). Since
roughly 2 percent of the 1933 quarter 2 British-born birth cohort migrated to the United States, the
reform would have had to have reduced US-bound migration to zero in order to explain our null mor-
tality ndings. Since our mortality estimates are small and our migration estimates are, on balance,
positive, we do not think that dierential migration patterns can explain our mortality results.
Appendix E: Mortality Simulations
In our main analysis, we report estimates of the eects of the compulsory schooling changes on
age-based mortality rates. Overall we nd little evidence that either law change aected mortality.
One might wonder how the estimates of the previous literature would translate into estimates using
our regression framework. For this reason, we conduct a series of simulations assuming eects on
life expectancy of the size of those found in Lleras-Muney (2005).
We perform our simulation in several steps:
1. First, we construct age-specic mortality rates using age x year death data from the Human
Mortality Database at Berkeley. These data provide the number of deaths by age, so we are
able to compute the probability of death for each year of life. We compute these age-specic
mortality rates using the mortality rates for the 1933 birth cohort for the 1947 law change and
the 1957 birth cohort for the 1972 law change. However, by 2006, the last year of data, both of
these cohorts have many members still living. To address this, we use the age-specic mortality
55We cannot cleanly identify the eect of the second reform on immigration to the U.S. because of a lack of
data by month of birth (the 1972 reform aected cohorts born part-way through the third quarter of 1957 - (i.e.,
September 1957 and later)).
44rates of the 1910 cohort, a cohort that is old enough to have had much of its members die. For
the 1933 cohort, we use the age-specic mortality rates of the 1910 cohort beginning at age 74,
then compute the fraction of the 1933 cohort still living at age 74. Then, our estimated mortality
rates for the 74+ ages for the 1933 cohort are the age-specic mortality rates for the 1910 cohort
divided by the fraction of the 1910 cohort dying between the ages of 74 and 96 multiplied by
the fraction of the 1933 cohort alive at age 74. We perform an analogous procedure for the 1957
cohort although we need to estimate the age-specic mortality rates using the 1910 cohort over
a wider span of ages.
2. Second, for each individual born, we simulate years of education as a linear function of a random
draw and their date of birth. More specically, for the 1947 reform, we use the following equation
to generate simulated years of schooling:
education = 0:00471R + 0:47D + 10:08 + u
where education is years of schooling, R is the running variable in birth quarter relative to 1933
quarter 2, D is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the quarter of birth is 1933 quarter 2 or later, and
u is a random variable. The random variable u is distributed normal with standard deviation
of 1.48 (based on the observed standard deviation of years of education). The coecients in
this equation are also based on the data (i.e., 0.00471 is the cohort trend in years of schooling,
0.47 is the eect of the 1947 reform on years of schooling, and 10.08 is the average years of
schooling for the pre-reform cohort). In this simulation, the date of birth aects education both
through the eect of the changes to compulsory schooling laws and through cohort-level changes
in education. A similar simulating equation is used for the 1972 reform.
3. Third, for each individual, we simulate age at death. From step 1, we have the probability of
death at each integer age and, thus, the cumulative distribution of age at death. We draw from
this empirical distribution to obtain each individual's preliminary simulated age of death. In
practice, we assign individuals non-integer ages by linearly interpolating the cumulative distri-
bution of age at death between integer ages. To take account of across-cohort trends in mortality
and the postulated eect of education on life expectancy, we generate age of death as a linear
function of this preliminary age at death, cohort level trends in age at death, a 1.5 year eect of
education on life expectancy and some individual-level and cohort-level mean-zero noise. The
variance of this noise is intended to emulate the variance observed in the data. That is,
expectancy = expectancysim + (0:05 + )R + (1:5 + )(education   10:55) + 
where expectancy is age at death, expectancysim is the simulated age at death computed above,
 is a cohort-specic normally-distributed random variable with standard deviation of 0.05 (the
value of this random variable is the same for all individuals in the same birth cohort), R is the
running variable in birth quarter relative to 1933 quarter 2,  is a random normal variable with
standard deviation of 1, and  is a random normal variable with standard deviation of 5. Here
we allow for the coecients on the cohort trends and education trends to be stochastic. This
adds variability to our simulated data to match the patterns we see in the observed data. Note
that the 0.05 coecient on the running variable denotes the cohort trend in life expectancy,
1.5 is the eect of education on life expectancy found by Lleras-Muney (2005), and 10.55 (e.g.,
10.08+0.47) is the average level of schooling for the post-reform cohort.
4. Next we impose sample restrictions consistent with our data (i.e., we only observe deaths oc-
curring between 1970 and 2007) and calculate the age-based mortality rates as in our main
analysis.
45We report the graphical results of our simulation in Appendix Figures E1 and E2. These gures
show that a 1.5 year eect of education on life expectancy would generate noticeable discontinuities
in our mortality outcomes. Since we see no such discontinuities in our 1947 graphs, our analysis
suggests that an extra year of education has eects on life expectancy much smaller than 1.5 years.
For the 1972 change, the mortality eects are more dicult to detect. This is because of the infre-
quency of death at the ages observed for that population. These eects should still, however, be
noticeable in the graphs.
46Figure 1: Years of full-time education by quarter of birth 
Notes: Raw fractions are based on pooled waves (1991-2004) of the Health Survey of England. The vertical lines are cutoffs 
corresponding to the first cohorts subject to the new compulsory schooling laws. The first of these took effect on 1 April 1947, 






1921 1926 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971
No university degree <=11 Years <=10 Years <=9 YearsFigure 2: The impact of the compulsory schooling changes on educational attainment
Notes: Samples are based on the Health Survey of England: 1991-2004. Points represent means among people in each month-of-birth cell. The estimated discontinuities 








1926 1931 1936 1940
Estimated discontinuity: -0.456 (0.018)








1926 1931 1936 1940
Estimated discontinuity: -0.453 (0.018)








1955 1950 1960 1965
Estimated discontinuity: -0.237 (0.023)








1955 1950 1960 1965
Estimated discontinuity: -0.271 (0.022)
Female: 1972 change: <=10 years of educationFigure 3: The impact of the 1947 change on mortality
Notes: The death rate is defined as the fraction of the cohort dying between the specified ages multiplied by 1000 where the denominator is the size of the cohort at 
birth. Points represent the death rate for each quarter-of-birth cell. The estimated discontinuities are based on local linear regressions; the standard errors of the estimates 























1926 1931 1936 1940
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: 4.87 (2.93)























1926 1931 1936 1940
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: 2.3 (1.7)























1926 1931 1936 1940
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: 3.59 (2.24)
All: Mortality Rate for Ages 45-69Figure 4: The impact of the 1947 change on mortality by 5-year age group
Notes: The death rate is defined as the fraction of the cohort dying between the specified ages multiplied by 1000 where the denominator is the size of the cohort at 
birth. Points represent the death rate for each quarter-of-birth cell.  The estimated discontinuities are based on local linear regressions; the standard errors of the 



















1926 1931 1936 1940
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: 0.64 (0.33)

















1926 1931 1936 1940
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: 0.58 (0.4)

















1926 1931 1936 1940
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: 0.31 (0.56)

















1926 1931 1936 1940
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: 0.02 (0.58)

















1926 1931 1936 1940
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: 2.15 (0.99)
All: Mortality Rate for Ages 65-69Figure 5: The impact of the 1947 change on mortality by cause
Notes: The death rate is defined as the fraction of the cohort dying between the specified ages multiplied by 1000 where the denominator is the size of the cohort at 
birth. Points represent the death rate for each quarter-of-birth cell.  The estimated discontinuities are based on local linear regressions; the standard errors of the 















1926 1931 1936 1940
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: 0.34 (0.16)



















1926 1931 1936 1940
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: 0.85 (0.54)

















1926 1931 1936 1940
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: 0.55 (0.85)
All: Other Mortality Rate for Ages 45-64Figure 6: The impact of the 1972 change on mortality
Notes: The death rate is defined as the fraction of the cohort dying between the specified ages multiplied by 1000 where the denominator is the size of the cohort at 
birth. Points represent the death rate for each month-of-birth cell.  The estimated discontinuities are based on local linear regressions; the standard errors of the 
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Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: 0.51 (0.52)



















1950 1955 1960 1965
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: 0.09 (0.34)



















1950 1955 1960 1965
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: 0.28 (0.32)
All: Mortality Rate for Ages 20-44Figure 7: The impact of the 1972 change on mortality by 5-year age group
Notes: The death rate is defined as the fraction of the cohort dying between the specified ages multiplied by 1000 where the denominator is the size of the cohort at 
birth. Points represent the death rate for each month-of-birth cell. The estimated discontinuities are based on local linear regressions; the standard errors of the estimates 
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Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: -0.16 (0.1)



















1950 1955 1960 1965
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: -0.04 (0.07)



















1950 1955 1960 1965
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: 0.01 (0.08)














1950 1955 1960 1965
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: 0.07 (0.13)














1950 1955 1960 1965
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: 0.21 (0.21)
All: Mortality Rate for Ages 40-44Figure 8: The impact of the 1947 and 1972 changes on health outcomes and behaviors
   
Notes: Samples based on Health Survey of England: 1991-2004. Points represent means among people in each month-of-birth cell. Estimated discontinuities are based 










1926 1931 1936 1940
Estimated discontinuity: -0.008 (0.012)








1926 1931 1936 1940
Estimated discontinuity: -0.016 (0.013)








1955 1950 1960 1965
Estimated discontinuity: -0.004 (0.011)










1955 1950 1960 1965
Estimated discontinuity: 0.008 (0.014)
Current smoker (1972 change)Notes: Points represent means among people in each month-of-birth cell. The estimated discontinuities are based on local linear regressions; the standard errors of the 
estimates are presented in parentheses. The fitted values of these local linear regressions are also plotted.
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1955 1950 1960 1965
Estimated discontinuity: -0.42 (0.20)
1972 change: FemalesAppendix Figure B1a: Stylized description of compulsory school laws by month of birth
Notes: Not all local schools authorities followed the school entry policy depicted above: some admitted all students at the start of the academic year in which they 
















































































































1 April 1947 reform






bNotes: The x-axis denotes different birth cohorts. For example, the first part of the x-axis refers to those between January and April over the years 1919-1932.  The y-axis 
displays the minimum and maximum years and terms of full-time education for those who report leaving at the minimum school leaving age. There exists a minimum and a 
maximum because students that report leaving at the minimum school leaving age (e.g., 15) could have left at the first available opportunity or could have continued for one 
or two more terms before leaving. For example, people born between January and April in the years 1919-1932 who report leaving at the compulsory school leaving age (14) 
would have spent 9 years and one term in full-time education had they left at the first opportunity. If they did not leave at the first opportunity, they could have received 9 
years and two terms or 10 years of education. Since they report leaving at 14, they could not have received ten years and one term of education (or more) . See Appendix B 
for more details.
Appendix Figure B1b: Maximum/Minimum years and terms of full-time education for those leaving at 
























































































10 years + 1 term
10 years + 2 terms
11 years
11 years + 1 term
11 years + 2 terms
12 yearsAppendix Figure C1: The impact of the 1947 change on male earnings
Notes: Scatter plot based on sample as described in notes to Appendix Table C1a. Fitted solid line based on birth cohort (defined by month of birth) interacted with 










1926 1931 1936 1940
Estimated discontinuity: 0.079 (0.040)
Log gross weekly earnings: malesAppendix Figure E1: The simulated impact of the 1947 change on mortality
Notes: The death rate is defined as the fraction of the cohort dying between the specified ages multiplied by 1000 where the denominator is the size of the cohort at 
birth. Points represent the death rate for each quarter-of-birth cell. The estimated discontinuities are based on local linear regressions; the standard errors of the estimates 






























1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: -23.27 (4.22)

































1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: -20.64 (2.46)






























1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: -24.82 (2.85)
All: Mortality Rate for Ages 45-69Appendix Figure E2: The simulated impact of the 1972 change on mortality 
Notes: The death rate is defined as the fraction of the cohort dying between the specified ages multiplied by 1000 where the denominator is the size of the cohort at 
birth. Points represent the death rate for each month-of-birth cell. The estimated discontinuities are based on local linear regressions; the standard errors of the estimates 



























1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: -2.76 (0.34)



























1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: -1.59 (0.24)



























1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962
Year of Birth
Estimated Discontinuity: -1.73 (0.22)
All: Mortality Rate for Ages 20-44Table 1: The impact of the compulsory schooling changes on educational attainment
1947 ROSLA
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
-0.456 -0.453 -0.036 -0.032 0.019 0.022 0.018 0.022 0.017 0.021 0.439 0.420
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.059) (0.062)
Dependent variable mean 0.58 0.58 0.70 0.70 0.83 0.83 0.87 0.87 0.91 0.91 10.11 10.11
Observations 8524 8524 8524 8524 8524 8524 8524 8524 8524 8524 8524 8524
-0.453 -0.452 -0.087 -0.076 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.547 0.527
(0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.058) (0.054)
Dependent variable mean 0.58 0.58 0.71 0.71 0.84 0.84 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.93 10.04 10.04
Observations 9669 9669 9669 9669 9669 9669 9669 9669 9669 9669 9669 9669
1972 ROSLA
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Panel A: Men
-0.237 -0.218 -0.041 -0.029 -0.045 -0.038 -0.020 -0.015 0.367 0.318
(0.023) (0.016) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.064) (0.049)
Dependent variable mean 0.30 0.30 0.63 0.63 0.71 0.71 0.78 0.78 11.54 11.54
Observations 9118 9118 9118 9118 9118 9118 9118 9118 9118 9118
Panel B: Women
-0.271 -0.243 -0.021 -0.011 -0.001 -0.003 0.016 0.016 0.294 0.252
(0.022) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.058) (0.050)
Dependent variable mean 0.33 0.33 0.61 0.61 0.71 0.71 0.82 0.82 11.51 11.51




<=10 Years <=9 Years Years of Education <=13 Years <=12 Years
Notes:  Table gives the estimated effect of compulsory schooling law change on various outcomes.  All regressions estimated using pooled waves of the 
Health Survey of England. All regressions in columns (1) include a linear function of month of birth and a linear interaction of month of birth and a dummy 
variable for being born after the relevant threshold. All regressions in column (2) also include for male dummy, calendar month-of-birth dummies, year-of-
survey dummies, month-of-survey dummies and a third-order polynomial in age. The dependent variable mean is the mean for the last pre-reform cohort. 
Robust standard errors clustered by month of birth are presented in parentheses. 
<=11 Years <=12 Years <=13 Years Years of Education <=10 YearsTable 2: The impact of the 1947 change on mortality rates
Probability of Dying Between…
Ages 45-49 Ages 50-54 Ages 55-59 Ages 60-64 Ages 65-69 Ages 45-69
Panel A: Men
Reduced-Form Estimate 1.011 0.608 0.726 0.446 0.350 3.206 4.866
(0.005) (0.341) (0.475) (0.440) (0.627) (1.359) (2.932)
Death Rate for 1933Q1 NA 17.48 28.68 41.72 57.61 75.85 221.33
Observations 30552 43 45 31 45 21 21
Bandwidth in Quarters 11 22 23 16 23 11 11
Panel B: Women
Reduced-Form Estimate 1.004 0.841 0.063 0.168 -0.064 1.930 2.296
(0.006) (0.385) (0.347) (0.421) (0.448) (0.576) (1.703)
Death Rate for 1933Q1 NA 11.78 18.63 25.97 37.43 51.72 145.52
Observations 30552 25 47 47 55 21 21
Bandwidth in Quarters 11 13 24 24 28 11 11
Panel C: Overall
Reduced-Form Estimate 1.008 0.740 0.643 0.411 0.117 2.577 3.590
(0.004) (0.334) (0.315) (0.371) (0.477) (0.831) (2.240)
Death Rate for 1933Q1 NA 14.70 23.77 34.03 47.76 64.07 184.31
Observations 61104 27 37 37 45 21 21
Bandwidth in Quarters 11 14 19 19 23 11 11
Hazard Rate: 1970-2007
Notes: The first set of estimates, the hazard rate results, report the log-odds ratio for the probability of dying for those just to the right of the birth cohort threshold for 
the 1947 change versus those just to the left of the threshold. The bandwidth for the hazard analysis is chosen based on the bandwidth for the 45-69 age group 
mortality regression. For these regressions, the standard errors are clustered at the level of the month-of-birth cohort. These regressions include calendar month-of-
birth fixed effects, age fixed effects, and a fully-interacted linear polynomial in month-of-birth cohort relative to April 1947. The second set of estimates give the 
estimated effect of the 1947 change in compulsory schooling laws on mortality rates between the ages specified. The death rate equals the number of deaths between 
the denoted ages divided by the size of the quarterly birth cohort at birth multiplied by 1000. All of these mortality rate regressions use data by quarter-of-birth birth 
cohort from the Office of National Statistics. All mortality rate regressions include calendar quarter-of-birth fixed effects and are weighted by cohort size. For the non-
hazard rate results, chosen bandwidths are based on a cross-validation procedure described in the text. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.Table 3: The impact of the 1947 change on mortality rates by cause
Ages 45-49 Ages 50-54 Ages 55-59 Ages 60-64 Ages 45-64
Reduced-Form Estimate 0.032 0.033 0.089 0.064 0.340
(0.032) (0.065) (0.065) (0.125) (0.161)
Death Rate for 1933Q1 0.80 0.81 1.58 3.55 6.75
Observations 39 31 39 27 33
Bandwidth in Quarters 20 16 20 14 17
Reduced-Form Estimate 0.080 0.212 -0.152 -0.049 0.849
(0.291) (0.319) (0.167) (0.312) (0.542)
Death Rate for 1933Q1 5.66 9.69 12.50 17.79 45.64
Observations 17 25 73 33 33
Bandwidth in Quarters 9 13 37 17 17
Reduced-Form Estimate 0.405 0.358 -0.185 -0.256 0.554
(0.147) (0.218) (0.352) (0.445) (0.853)
Death Rate for 1933Q1 7.65 12.28 18.05 23.53 61.50
Observations 47 23 25 23 27
Bandwidth in Quarters 24 12 13 12 14
Panel C: Deaths from Other Causes
Panel A: Respiratory Deaths
Panel B: Circulatory Deaths
Notes: Table gives estimated effect of 1947 change in compulsory schooling laws on mortality rates 
between the ages specified. The death rate equals the number of deaths between the denoted ages 
divided by the size of the quarterly birth cohort at birth multiplied by 1000. All regressions use data by 
quarter-of-birth cohort from the Office of National Statistics. All regressions include calendar quarter-of-
birth fixed effects and a male dummy variable and are weighted by birth cohort size.  Chosen 
bandwidths are based on a cross-validation procedure described in the text. Robust standard errors are 
presented in parentheses.Table 4: The impact of the 1972 change on mortality rates
Probability of Dying Between…
Ages 20-24 Ages 25-29 Ages 30-34 Ages 35-39 Ages 40-44 Ages 20-44
Panel A: Men
Reduced-Form Estimate 1.022 0.051 -0.0002 0.158 0.129 0.202 0.515
(0.012) (0.260) (0.1243) (0.129) (0.202) (0.280) (0.519)
Death Rate for August 1957 NA 5.27 3.95 4.90 7.01 9.58 30.71
Observations 32922 61 131 179 95 61 91
Bandwidth in Months 46 31 66 90 48 31 46
Panel B: Women
Reduced-Form Estimate 0.967 -0.125 -0.063 -0.162 0.008 0.232 0.091
(0.017) (0.086) (0.078) (0.070) (0.132) (0.187) (0.345)
Death Rate for August 1957 NA 1.80 2.15 2.46 4.44 6.62 17.47
Observations 31684 141 167 327 95 91 87
Bandwidth in Months 44 71 84 168 48 46 44
Panel C: Overall
Reduced-Form Estimate 1.001 -0.158 -0.038 0.009 0.070 0.214 0.284
(0.009) (0.101) (0.069) (0.079) (0.129) (0.209) (0.318)
Death Rate for August 1957 NA 3.58 3.07 3.71 5.76 8.14 24.26
Observations 64610 135 147 179 95 37 89
Bandwidth in Months 45 68 74 90 48 19 45
Hazard Rate: 1978-2007
Notes: The first set of estimates, the hazard rate results, report the log-odds ratio for the probability of dying for those just to the right of the birth cohort 
threshold for the 1972 change versus those just to the left of the threshold. The bandwidth for the hazard analysis is chosen based on the bandwidth for the 20-
49 age group mortality regression. For these regressions, the standard errors are clustered at the level of the month-of-birth cohort. Hazard rate regressions 
include calendar month-of-birth fixed effects, age fixed effects, and a fully-interacted linear polynomial in month-of-birth cohort relative to September 1957. The 
second set of estimates gives the estimated effect of the 1972 change in compulsory schooling laws on mortality rates between the ages specified. The death rate 
equals the number of deaths between the denoted ages divided by the size of the monthly birth cohort at birth multiplied by 1000. All these mortality rate 
regressions use data by month-of-birth cohort from the Office of National Statistics. All mortality rate  regessions include calendar month-of-birth fixed effects 
and are weighted by cohort size. For the non-hazard rate results, chosen bandwidths are based on a cross-validation 
procedure described in the text. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.Table 5a: The effects of education on health - 1947 change
Outcome Mean (sd) OLS RF  w/o X RF IV N
Health fair or bad 0.35 -0.088 -0.008 -0.009 -0.018 18180
(0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.025)
Long illness 0.61 -0.028 0.014 0.010 0.022 18186
(0.006) (0.015) (0.014) (0.029)
Reduced activity 0.19 -0.019 0.001 0.001 0.001 18189
(0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.021)
Obese (BMI>30) 0.25 -0.023 0.027 0.026 0.054 16508
(0.006) (0.014) (0.014) (0.031)
Overweight (BMI>25) 0.74 -0.018 -0.016 -0.021 -0.043 16508
(0.006) (0.015) (0.014) (0.028)
BMI 27.70 -0.223 0.108 0.0703 0.148 16508
(4.50) (0.058) (0.138) (0.132) (0.273)
Hypertension 0.62 -0.024 -0.020 -0.018 -0.036 13574
(0.007) (0.015) (0.015) (0.031)
Diastolic blood pressure 79.35 -0.267 0.192 0.313 0.635 13574
(12.08) (0.163) (0.375) (0.371) (0.759)
Table 5b: The effects of education on health behaviors - 1947 change
Outcome Mean OLS RF RF IV N
w/o X
Currently smoke 0.20 -0.056 -0.016 -0.010 -0.021 18193
(0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.026)
Ever smoke 0.71 -0.032 0.004 0.013 0.027 18193
(0.005) (0.016) (0.014) (0.030)
Currently drink 0.80 0.047 0.018 0.017 0.036 18190
(0.005) (0.011) (0.010) (0.021)
Eat fruit daily 0.65 0.053 0.015 0.013 0.028 11781
(0.007) (0.019) (0.016) (0.036)
Each veg daily 0.65 0.054 0.033 0.041 0.090 11768
(0.007) (0.016) (0.015) (0.030)
Take vitamins 0.35 0.041 0.027 0.023 0.046 14311
(0.007) (0.019) (0.019) (0.038)
Physically active 0.33 0.046 0.003 0.007 0.014 10855
(0.007) (0.018) (0.017) (0.036)
Notes:  See notes for Table 5a.
Panel A: Self-reported 
Panel B: Objectively-measured
Notes: These estimates are based on Health Survey of England data: 1991-2004. Reported outcome means and 
standard deviations in parentheses (for continuous outcomes) are for the last pre-reform cohort.  The column 
labeled OLS presents the ordinary least squares estimates, the column labeled RF w/o X presents the reduced-
form estimates excluding control variables, the column labeled RF presents the reduced-form estimates including 
control variables, the column labeled IV presents the instrumental variables estimates, and the column labeled N is 
the number of observations. Both the RF and IV estimates adjust for sex dummy, month-of-birth dummies, 
month- and year-of-interview dummies and third-order polynomial in age at time of survey (measured in months). 
Robust standard errors clustered at the month-of-birth level are presented in parentheses.Table 6a: The effects of education on health - 1972 change
Outcome Mean (sd) OLS RF  w/o X RF IV N
Health fair or bad 0.18 -0.072 -0.004 -0.005 -0.017 19913
(0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.036)
Long illness 0.37 -0.049 -0.001 -0.0001 -0.001 19910
(0.009) (0.013) (0.0124) (0.044)
Reduced activity 0.16 -0.031 -0.024 -0.025 -0.091 19907
(0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.038)
Obese (BMI>30) 0.18 -0.029 -0.008 -0.006 -0.023 18473
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.037)
Overweight (BMI>25) 0.56 -0.025 0.010 0.007 0.027 18473
(0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.052)
BMI 26.28 -0.338 0.044 0.042 0.155 18473
(4.71) (0.097) (0.129) (0.122) (0.443)
Hypertension 0.20 -0.002 0.004 0.003 0.009 15097
(0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.049)
Diastolic blood pressure 74.17 -0.115 0.300 0.274 0.985 15097
(10.48) (0.225) (0.361) (0.342) (1.235)
Table 6b: The effects of education on health behavior - 1972 change
Outcome Mean OLS RF RF IV N
w/o X
Currently smoke 0.30 -0.118 0.008 0.010 0.036 19919
(0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.048)
Ever smoke 0.66 -0.076 -0.002 -0.004 -0.014 19919
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.041)
Currently drink 0.91 0.027 0.010 0.009 0.031 19916
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.028)
Eat fruit daily 0.52 0.060 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 12907
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.050)
Each veg daily 0.56 0.040 -0.018 -0.007 -0.026 12899
(0.011) (0.019) (0.019) (0.067)
Take vitamins 0.24 0.037 0.008 0.010 0.033 16050
(0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.045)
Physically 0.54 0.065 -0.015 -0.015 -0.059 11785
(0.012) (0.019) (0.019) (0.076)
Notes: See notes for Table 6a.
Panel A: Self-reported health measures
Panel B: Objective health measures
Notes: These estimates are based on Health Survey of England data: 1991-2004. Reported outcome means and 
standard deviations in parentheses (for continuous outcomes) are for the last pre-reform cohort. The column 
labeled OLS presents the ordinary least squares estimates, the column labeled RF w/o X presents the reduced-
form estimates excluding control variables, the column labeled RF  presents the reduced-form estimates including 
control variables, the column labeled IV presents the instrumental variables estimates, and  the column labeled N 
is the number of observations. Both the RF and IV estimates adjust for sex dummy, month-of-birth dummies, 
month- and year-of-interview dummies and third-order polynomial in age at time of survey (measured in months). 
Robust standard errors clustered at the month-of-birth level are presented in parentheses. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep var  RF w/o X RF w/o X
mean RF w/o X RF w/X Female Male
Health fair or bad (2001) 57.45 -0.460 -0.381 -0.492 -0.266
(0.217) (0.190) (0.224) (0.308)
Health bad (2001) 17.66 -0.319 -0.345 -0.268 -0.424
(0.206) (0.154) (0.163) (0.253)
Limiting long-term illness (2001) 39.59 -0.192 -0.070 0.063 -0.212
(0.203) (0.180) (0.188) (0.324)
Limiting long-term illness (1991) 21.42 0.215 0.169 0.129 0.210
(0.155) (0.109) (0.162) (0.216)
Health fair or bad (2001) 31.43 -0.478 -0.152 -0.055 -0.243
(0.162) (0.107) (0.171) (0.175)
Health bad (2001) 8.38 -0.169 -0.069 -0.027 -0.109
(0.077) (0.068) (0.083) (0.097)
Limiting long-term illness (2001) 13.74 -0.183 -0.087 -0.097 -0.077
(0.073) (0.072) (0.100) (0.111)
Limiting long-term illness (1991) 5.10 -0.095 -0.048 -0.048 -0.048
(0.049) (0.046) (0.073) (0.070)
Table 7: The impact of the compulsory schooling changes on self-
reported health
Panel A: 1947 ROSLA
Panel B: 1972 ROSLA
Notes: These estimates based on 1991 or 2001 Census data. Reported outcome means are for the last pre-
reform cohort. The column labeled RF w/o X presents the reduced-form estimates excluding control 
variables and the column labeled RF presents the reduced-form estimates including control variables. 
Columns (2) and (3) estimates adjust for sex and month-of-birth dummies. Robust standard errors are 
presented in parentheses. Outcome Mean OLS RF w/o X RF IV N
Health fair or bad 0.25 -0.068 0.008 0.006 0.013 40899
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.016)
Long illness 0.54 -0.030 0.024 0.021 0.046 40909
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.020)
Reduced activity 0.17 -0.020 0.009 0.008 0.018 40915
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.016)
Currently smoke 0.23 -0.058 -0.015 -0.007 -0.015 29570
(0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.022)
Ever smoke 0.74 -0.028 0.007 0.014 0.031 29566
(0.004) (0.012) (0.011) (0.023)
Currently drink 0.81 0.044 0.011 0.013 0.028 29567
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016)
Individual outcomes OLS RF  RF IV N
w/o X
Avg coeff -0.045 0.002 0.001 0.002
Std coeffs -0.096 0.005 -0.002 -0.004 54555
(se) (0.008) (0.019) (0.019) (0.039)
Avg coeff -0.021 -0.018 -0.019 -0.039
Std coeffs -0.053 -0.005 -0.008 -0.016 46590
(se) (0.009) (0.022) (0.022) (0.044)
Avg coeff -0.044 -0.006 0.001 0.003
Std coeffs -0.081 -0.015 0.001 0.001 36386
(se) (0.008) (0.029) (0.027) (0.056)
Avg coeff 0.049 0.019 0.021 0.045
Std coeffs 0.083 0.041 0.044 0.093 48715
(se) (0.007) (0.023) (0.021) (0.042)
Notes: Each panel presents summary estimates for the group of variables listed in the first column. The first row 
of each panel presents the average of the individual estimates from Table 5. The second row presents the average 
of the standardized estimates (see text for details). The third row reports the associated standard error of this 
standardized summary measure (see text for details). See Appendix Table A1a for description of the columns.
Obese, overweight, 
hypertension
Currently smoke, ever 
smoke
Eat fruit, eat veg, take 
vitamins, active
Panel B: Health behaviors
Notes:  These estimates are based on models that pool GHS data for 1986-1996 and HSE data for 1991-2004.  
The column labeled "OLS" presents the ordinary least squares estimates, the column labeled RF w/o X presents 
the reduced-form estimates excluding control variables, the column labeled RF presents the reduced-form 
estimates including control variables, the column labeled IV presents the instrumental variables estimates, and the 
column labeled N is the number of observations. Both the RF and IV estimates adjust for GHS dummy, sex 
dummy,  calendar month-of-birth dummies, month- and year-of-interview dummies and a third-order polynomial 
in age at time of survey (measured in months). Robust standard errors clustered at the month-of-birth level are 
presented in parentheses. The reported mean is the mean for the last pre-reform cohort. 
Appendix Table A1b: Summary estimates - 1947 change
Health bad, longstanding 
illness, reduced activity
Panel A: Health measures
Appendix Table A1a: Pooled models of the effects of education on health  - 
1947 changeOutcome Mean OLS RF w/o X RF IV N
Health fair or bad 0.119 -0.051 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 43541
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.019)
Long illness 0.304 -0.044 -0.001 0.002 0.009 43533
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.029)
Reduced activity 0.137 -0.017 -0.014 -0.014 -0.050 43535
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.021)
Currently smoke 0.303 -0.127 0.014 0.015 0.051 31647
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.034)
Ever smoke 0.669 -0.082 0.007 0.004 0.014 31642
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.033)
Currently drink 0.921 0.022 0.004 0.003 0.007 31644
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.018)
Outcome OLS RF RF IV N
w/o X
Avg coeff -0.072 -0.004 -0.005 -0.017
Std coeffs -0.124 -0.026 -0.026 -0.093 59730
(se) (0.015) (0.023) (0.018) (0.067)
Avg coeff -0.027 0.001 0.000 0.002
Std coeffs -0.064 0.003 0.005 0.020 52043
(se) (0.014) (0.022) (0.022) (0.082)
Avg coeff -0.097 0.003 0.003 0.011
Std coeffs -0.176 0.007 0.007 0.026 39838
(se) (0.014) (0.024) (0.023) (0.085)
Avg coeff 0.050 -0.006 -0.003 -0.013
Std coeffs 0.079 -0.011 -0.007 -0.028 53641
(se) (0.012) (0.019) (0.019) (0.072)
Notes: Each panel presents summary estimates for the group of variables listed in the first column. The first row of 
each panel presents the average of the individual estimates from Table 6. The second row presents the average of 
the standardized estimates (see text for details). The third row reports the associated standard error of this 
standardized summary measure (see text for details). See Appendix Table A2a for description of the columns.




Currently smoke, ever 
smoke
Eat fruit, eat veg, take 
vitamins, active
Panel B: Health behaviors
Notes:  These estimates based on models that pool GHS data for 1986-1996 and HSE data for 1991-2004.  The 
reported mean is the mean for the last pre-reform cohort. The column labeled "OLS" presents the ordinary least 
squares estimates, the column labeled RF w/o X presents the reduced-form estimates excluding control variables, 
the column labeled RF presents the reduced-form estimates including control variables, the column labeled IV 
presents the instrumental variables estimates, and the column labeled N is the number of observations. Both the 
RF and IV estimates adjust for GHS dummy, sex dummy, calendar month-of-birth dummies, month- and year-of-
interview dummies and a third-order polynomial in age at time of survey (measured in months). Robust standard 
errors clustered at the month-of-birth level are presented in parentheses.
Appendix Table A2b: Summary estimates - 1972 change
Panel A: Health measures
Appendix Table A2a: Pooled models of the effects of education on health - 
1972 changeOutcome Mean (sd) OLS IV-2 IV-3 IV-4 N
Health fair or bad 0.25 -0.081 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 106589
(0.003) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)  
0.94 0.96 0.62
Long illness 0.46 -0.033 0.014 0.012 0.023 106601
(0.003) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)  
0.19 0.21 0.79
Reduced activity 0.16 -0.021 0.013 0.014 0.014 106578
(0.002) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  
0.73 0.77 0.24
Obese (BMI>30) 0.21 -0.024 0.018 0.016 0.028 97115
(0.003) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)  
0.27 0.31 0.39
Overweight (BMI>25) 0.62 -0.012 0.010 0.003 -0.0003 97115
(0.003) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)  
0.22 0.29 0.12
BMI 26.83 -0.215 0.270 0.205 0.312 97115
(4.63) (0.030) (0.173) (0.164) (0.162)  
0.02 0.04 0.43
Hypertension 0.36 -0.015 -0.029 -0.029 -0.025 79298
(0.003) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)  
0.54 0.55 0.96
Diastolic blood pressure 76.0 -0.206 -0.094 0.038 -0.389 79298
(11.86) (0.084) (0.445) (0.423) (0.423)  
0.06 0.09 0.34  
Notes:  This table presents estimates of the effects of years of education on various outcomes using data 
from the Health Survey of England (pooled waves 1991-2004). The instruments are 1) a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if subject to the 1947 ROSLA and equal to 0 otherwise and 2) a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
subject to the 1972 ROSLA and equal to 0 otherwise. Over-identification test statistics (p-values) are 
presented in the third row of each panel.  Estimates in the IV-2 column are based on a second-order 
polynomial in age, estimates in the IV-3 and IV-4 columns are based on third- and fourth-order 
polynomials in age respectively. The models also regression adjust for sex, calendar month-of-birth 
dummies and year- and month-of-survey dummies. The IV estimates also adjust for a polynomial in 
month of birth. Robust standard errors are clustered by month of birth. Mean (sd) refers to the mean 
(standard deviation for continuous outcomes) of the entire sample.
Appendix Table A3a: The effects of education on measures of 
health - 1947 & 1972 compulsory schooling changesOutcome Mean (sd) OLS IV-2 IV-3 IV-4 N
Currently smoke 0.27 -0.072 -0.017 -0.020 -0.035 106632
(0.003) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)  
0.21 0.17 0.50
Ever smoke 0.71 -0.040 -0.004 -0.007 -0.041 106632
(0.003) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)  
0.00 0.00 0.51
Currently drink 0.87 0.042 0.003 0.003 0.006 106618
(0.002) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)  
0.53 0.53 0.9
Eat fruit daily 0.58 0.056 0.066 0.054 0.037 69094
(0.004) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)  
0.20 0.12 0.65
Each veg daily 0.61 0.043 0.053 0.039 0.025 69045
(0.004) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)  
0.61 0.43 0.44
Take vitamins 0.29 0.035 0.005 0.004 -0.014 84411
(0.003) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
0.01 0.01 0.65
Active 0.44 0.055 -0.025 -0.025 -0.001 63064
(0.004) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
0.01 0.01 0.86
Notes:  This table presents estimates of the effects of years of education on various outcomes using data from 
the Health Survey of England (pooled waves 1991-2004). The instruments are 1) a dummy variable equal to 1 
if subject to the 1947 ROSLA and equal to 0 otherwise and 2) a dummy variable equal to 1 if subject to the 
1972 ROSLA and equal to 0 otherwise. Over-identification test statistics (p-values) are presented in the third 
row of each panel.  Estimates in the IV-2 column are based on a second-order polynomial in age, estimates in 
the IV-3 and IV-4 columns are based on third- and fourth-order polynomials in age respectively. The models 
also regression adjust for sex, calendar month-of-birth dummies and year- and month-of-survey dummies. 
The IV estimates also adjust for a polynomial in month of birth. Robust standard errors are clustered by 
month of birth. Mean (sd) refers to the mean (standard deviation for continuous outcomes) of the entire 
sample.
Appendix Table A3b: The effects of education on health behaviors -
1947 & 1972 compulsory schooling changesAppendix Table C1: Earnings impact of 1947 change to compulsory schooling
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Hours: 1-84 0.079 0.078 0.045 0.048 0.017 -0.006 -0.069 -0.078 -0.042 -0.030 0.017 0.015
(0.028) (0.038) (0.023) (0.031) (0.017) (0.023) (0.044) (0.053) (0.025) (0.032) (0.016) (0.021)
N 11964 3462 11964 3462 22553 7181 11133 3075 11133 3075 24364 7792
Normal hours 0.053 0.043 0.040 0.027 0.028 0.005 -0.065 -0.057 -0.050 -0.023 0.005 0.004
(0.022) (0.030) (0.022) (0.030) (0.015) (0.019) (0.043) (0.050) (0.025) (0.030) (0.015) (0.021)
N 11022 3156 11022 3156 22553 7181 10152 2787 10152 2787 24364 7792
Appendix Table C2: Earnings impact of 1972 change to compulsory schooling laws
Hours: 1-84 -0.0004 0.003 0.008 -0.014 0.015 -0.029
(0.025) (0.022) (0.016) (0.044) (0.027) (0.018)
N 6545 6545 9327 5964 5964 10462
Normal hours 0.004 0.007 0.014 0.034 0.013 -0.050
(0.022) (0.021) (0.016) (0.044) (0.030) (0.019)
N 6168 6168 9327 5359 5359 10462
Notes:  We report reduced-form estimates from local linear regression models using the month-of-birth discontinuity design of outcomes on calendar birth month, a dummy 
for birth month after September 1957, and an interaction of birth month and this dummy. The bandwidth is 40 months on either side of September 1957. Normal hours, 
determined from the data, are defined as 35-60 for males and 10-50 for females.
Panel A: Men Panel B: Women
Log Weekly Earnings Log Hourly Earnings Observed Working Log Weekly Earnings Log Hourly Earnings Observed Working
Notes: In column (1) we report reduced-form estimates from a global polynomial regression specification similar to that used by Devereux and Hart (2008), the main 
difference being that the column (1) estimates are generated using a month-of-birth discontinuity design, as opposed to the year-of-birth discontinuity design of Devereux and 
Hart (2008). In column (2) we report reduced-form estimates from local linear regression models of outcomes on calendar birth month, a dummy for birth month after April 
1933, and an interaction of birth month and this dummy. The bandwidth is 40 months on either side of April 1933. The observed working outcomes refer to the probability 
of being observed to work 1-84 hours (in the top panel) and working normal hours in the bottom panel. These are not conditional on working at all, hence can be interpreted 
as the probability of being in the samples used in the earnings analysis. Normal hours, determined from the data, are defined as 35-60 for males and 10-50 for females.
Panel A: Men Panel B: Women
Log Weekly Earnings Log Hourly Earnings Observed Working Log Weekly Earnings Log Hourly Earnings Observed WorkingAppendix Table D1: Effect of 1947 change to compulsory schooling laws
on migration to US
Reduced-Form Estimate 0.928 0.940 0.008 0.225 0.743 0.316
(0.342) (0.380) (0.137) (0.256) (0.236) (0.217)
Percent in US for 1933Q1 1.92 2.41 2.45 2.57 2.23 2.59
Bandwidth 26 35 26 44 44 42
Dataset 1960 Census 1970 Census 1980 Census 2005 ACS 2006 ACS 2007 ACS
Observations 51 69 51 87 87 83
Reduced-Form Estimate -0.028 0.039 0.007 0.250 0.257 -0.085
(0.123) (0.294) (0.117) (0.182) (0.206) (0.197)
Percent in US for 1933Q1 1.05 1.32 1.00 0.91 1.92 1.98
Bandwidth 40 39 27 35 43 34
Dataset 1960 Census 1970 Census 1980 Census 2005 ACS 2006 ACS 2007 ACS
Observations 79 77 53 69 85 67
Reduced-Form Estimate 0.131 0.619 0.023 0.172 0.492 0.092
(0.137) (0.230) (0.070) (0.152) (0.173) (0.137)
Percent in US for 1933Q1 1.47 1.85 1.71 1.72 2.07 2.27
Bandwidth 49 40 27 47 44 37
Dataset 1960 Census 1970 Census 1980 Census 2005 ACS 2006 ACS 2007 ACS




Notes: This table presents regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of the 1947 reform on immigration to the United States 
from Britain. The bandwidth is chosen using the cross-validation procedure discussed in the text. These regressions include  a fully-
interacted linear polynomial in quarter-of-birth cohort relative to April 1947. The migration rate equals the number of persons 
appearing in the US dataset divided by the size of the quarterly birth cohort at birth multiplied by 100. All of these regressions use 
data by quarter-of-birth birth cohort from the Office of National Statistics. Reported bandwidths are in quarters. Robust standard 
errors are presented in parentheses.